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Introduction
The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development has decided to inform the ongoing
debates on the consequences of the war in August 2008 by conducting and publishing a prelimi-
nary study.
It is still too early to carry out a conclusive analysis of the causes and results of the recent war in
Georgia, especially as the process is not over yet, but CIPDD’s contribution at this stage will prove
of value, if only because the discussion has just begun in Georgia. Our goal was to create a Georgian
analytical product on the Russian-Georgian war to inform both international and domestic Georgian
discussions.
A work group was created on the Caucasus Institute’s initiative. Although every effort has been made
to take into account the original interviews and results of academic research, due to time pressures
the main source of information has been the media.
The present analysis includes three main parts:
1. political analysis
2. economic analysis
3. environmental analysis
Key recommendations are provided in bullet form at the end of each chapter.
(1) The political part reviews developments in the international arena and domestic political events
in key countries involved in the conflict. We analyze possible consequences of the war for Georgia,
for countries of the region, and for the international order. Key recommendations are provided at the
end of the chapter.
(2) The economic part deals with the damage which was caused both to the country’s infrastructure
and to the country’s economy. Potential direct and indirect damage is analyzed sector-by-sector.
(3) The environmental part was added to the study because of the large extent of damage that
was caused to Georgian ecosystems by Russian forces. Forest fires, oil spills in the Black Sea
and other ecological calamities are the results of intentional actions by Russian forces and call
for appropriate legal action.
The study is accompanied by a timeline of events, which clearly demonstrates how the situation
escalated in Abkhazia and South Ossetia from February 2008 onwards.
Maps of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and of damage to the environment are attached to this document.
6
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1. Political analysis
Below is an analysis of the political causes of the August 2008 war and its likely consequences for
Russian, Georgian, and international politics. In the Russian and Georgian cases, the analysis focuses
on the impact of the war on foreign and domestic policies, governance. The international conse-
quences of the conflict are discussed in terms of its likely impact on former Soviet republics, the US
and the European Union.
1.1 Russia
This section deals with the causes for the Russian military intervention in Georgia and its con-
sequences for the international system, domestic policies, decision-making processes. The likely
impact of the Russian aggression on Moscow’s relations with the rest of the world is assessed
at the end.
1.1.1 International system level
To better understand Russian policy in August 2008, it is important to analyse the global processes
that have developed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to find out how these processes were
perceived by Russia itself.
Four major factors shaped the post-Soviet international environment for Russia:
1. the eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union
2. development of alternative energy transit routes
3. the “colour revolutions” in Soviet successor states
4. recognition the independence of Kosovo
(1) The eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union. After the demise of the USSR,
formerly socialist countries joined western alliances, notably NATO and the EU. Russia viewed this
process as a threat to its national security. The increasing cooperation of former Soviet republics with
NATO and EU, or their admission to these organisations, was especially worrying for Moscow. Three
Central European countries became NATO members in 1999. Seven Baltic and Eastern European
states followed suit in 2002. EU enlargement went hand in hand with NATO expansion.
(2) Alternative energy transit routes. Major international oil companies and the government of Azerbaijan
signed a contract in 1994 to develop the country’s offshore oil fields.1  They also agreed to construct
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to deliver Azerbaijani oil to European markets, bypassing Russian
territory. The Shah Deniz gas field came on stream at the same time. On June 27, 2006, the European
Commission, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria signed an agreement to build Nabucco,
a natural gas pipeline that will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Austria via
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.2  (The Nabucco project has not started yet.) Russia, a major
supplier of oil and natural gas to world markets, especially to Europe, is very uneasy about alternative
energy transit projects.
1 A Russian company, Lukoil, has a 10% stake in this contract. For more details read Nasser Sagheb and Masoud Javadi,
“Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” finally signed with Western oil consortium”, Azerbaijan International, Winter 1994
(2.4) http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24_articles/24_aioc.html (accessed September 15, 2008)
2 “Nabucco gas pipeline is approved”, BBC News, June 27, 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5121394.stm (accessed
September 15, 2008)
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Since the 1990s, Moscow has made every effort either to spoil attempts to build transit pipelines
outside Russian territory or to take control of alternative routes. The Russian political elite is afraid
that Moscow will lose its leverage to influence post-Soviet countries and European Union, and lose
revenues from transit fees, once alternative transit routes become available.
(3) The “colour revolutions” in Soviet successor states. Massive electoral fraud in the November 2003
parliamentary polls sparked civil unrest in Georgia and led to the fall of Eduard Shevardnadze’s
government. The so-called Rose Revolution was led by US-educated Mikheil Saakashvili, who had the
support of a majority of the country’s NGOs and other members of the newly-developed civil society.
The success of the Georgian revolution inspired similar events in Ukraine. The so-called Orange
Revolution in December 2004, which as in Georgia was triggered by election rigging, swept Viktor
Yushchenko and his pro-western coalition to power. Viktor Yanukovich, a pro-Moscow candidate who
was openly backed by the Kremlin, was defeated. One year later, rigged elections in Kyrgyzstan
sparked the so-called Tulip Revolution.
These events prompted Russian politicians and analysts to openly accuse Washington of conducting a
deliberate policy to first encircle Russia and then divide it. New laws were adopted by Moscow to
curb foreign funding of Russian NGOs and to put foreign organisations in Russia under tight control.3
Pro-Kremlin youth organisations were set up in Russia4  while official propaganda condemned the
“colour revolutions”.5  Russia viewed “the new wave of democratisation” as a deadly threat to its
influence and even its very existence.6
(4) The independence of Kosovo. When NATO launched its bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 to
protect the ethnic Albanian minority of Kosovo from the Serbs, Russia felt that its international prestige
and credibility were dealt a severe blow. Since the 19th century, Serbia has played a vital role in Russia’s
foreign policy. Russian emperors always claimed a stake in the Balkans’ political affairs under the pretext
of supporting their fellow Slavic and Orthodox nation. After a long period of the Russian involvement in
the Balkans, it was actually the first time that the fate of the region was determined by Russia’s adversary
– a western military-political alliance – without heeding Russia’s opinion.
In the following years, opposition to Kosovo’s independence became one of the main elements of
Russian foreign policy. Prestige apart, Russia’s objections were caused by the fear that the indepen-
dence of Kosovo might fuel secessionist movements in its own ethnic enclaves (mainly in the North
Caucasus and the Volga region). Kosovo formally declared independence from Serbia on February 17,
2008. Almost immediately, a majority of western countries responded by recognising the former Serbian
province as an independent state. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president at the time, condemned the
recognition of Kosovo’s independence as “immoral and illegal” and threatened global upheavals.7  The
Kremlin warned that the Kosovo case would inevitably set a precedent for other “frozen conflicts”,
especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia felt that it needed to respond to these events firmly in order to reassert its credibility and
prestige as a major world power. After Kosovo’s independence, Russia issued strongly worded political
statements but took few practical steps. This led many, separatist authorities among them, to question
Russia’s real capabilities.
3 “Russia: Amended Law Threatens NGOs”, Human Rights News, December 28, 2005, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/
12/28/russia12349.htm (accessed September 9, 2008).
4 Leonid Ragozin, “Russian youth on political barricades”, BBC News, March 2, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
4308655.stm (accessed September 10, 2008).
5 Robert Coalson, “Russia: Why the Kremlin likes the CIA”, RFE/RL, October 1, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/
1078841.html (accessed September 10, 2008).
6 Ivan Krastev, “Russia’s post-orange empire”, Open Democracy, October 20, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democ-
racy-ukraine/postorange_2947.jsp (accessed September 5, 2008).
7 Fred Weir, “Kosovo independence: Russia warns of separatist storm”, The Christian Science Monitor, February. 20, 2008,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0220/p06s01-woeu.html (accessed September 9, 2008).
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Apart from the perceived necessity to protect and/or restore its prestige, Russia’s motivation for
assertive actions can be explained by several other factors: (1) the global surge in oil and gas prices
over the last five years boosted Russia’s revenues and pumped billions of petrodollars into its coffers;8
(2) the European Union has become increasingly dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies;9  (3)
world attention is diverted by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and (4) the presidential campaign is
in full gear in the USA.
On April 16, Russia undertook the first measures to protect its prestige and its “privileged interests”
on the post-Soviet territories.10  The Russian president decreed the establishment of stronger formal ties
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.11  Earlier, the Kremlin had withdrawn from a CIS resolution12  on
economic sanctions against Abkhazia and restrictions on the deployment of armaments on Abkhaz
territory.13
After these legislative initiatives, Russia began large-scale military exercises on the Russian-Georgian
border, including naval exercises in the Black Sea, which continued almost incessantly from May
2008. The largest of them, codenamed “Caucasus 2008”,14  involved some 8,000 servicemen and lasted
until August 3. Russia’s military aggression against Georgia, which began on August 8 and culminated
in the recognition of South Ossetia’s15  and Abkhazia’s16  independence, was in fact Moscow’s final
response to the “western offensive”.
1.1.2 Domestic policy level
In the March 2008 presidential elections, Dimitry Medvedev, the man chosen by departing president
Vladimir Putin as his successor, became the new president of Russia. Speculation has been rife since
then – both in Russia and abroad – about the true relationship and the distribution of responsibilities
between president Medvedev and prime minister Vladimir Putin, and about who really rules Russia,
controls the armed forces and police, and determines the country’s foreign policy.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to briefly describe the Russian governance system which
emerged in Putin’s times. The appointment of Vladimir Putin, a previously little-known figure in
Russian politics, as prime minister heralded a new era in Russia – the rule of the so-called siloviki.
After Putin became president, former KGB men and retired high-ranking military and police officers
were promoted to key positions in government and to the boards of large state-run corporations.17
8 Detailed information about the Russian foreign reserves is available at the Russian Central Bank’s website: http://www.cbr.ru/
eng/print.asp?file=/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/inter_res_08_e.htm
9 Ariel Cohen, “Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy”, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #2083, Novem-
ber 5, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2083.cfm (accessed September 11, 2008).
10 Following the war with Georgia, Russian president Dimitry Medvedev defined five key principles of the Russian foreign
policy, one of which is termed Russia’s “privileged interests”. For more detailed information read Paul Reynolds, “New
Russian World Order”, BBC News, September 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm (accessed September
11, 2008).
11 “Russian Foreign Ministry’s Statement on Putin’s Instruction to Boost Ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. Civil
Georgia, April 16, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17593 (accessed September 11, 2008).
12 “Russian Deputy Foreign Minister on Lifting Abkhaz Sanctions”, Civil Georgia, March 17, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=17373&search= (accessed September 10, 2008).
13 The full text of the resolution – “1996 CIS Treaty on Abkhaz Sanctions”, Civil Georgia, March 7, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/
eng/article.php?id=17293 (accessed September 10, 2008).
14 “Russia Holds Military Exercises in the North Caucasus”, North Caucasus Weekly, Volume 9, Issue 128, The Jamestown
Foundation, July 17, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly/article.php?articleid=2374316 (accessed September 10,
2008).
15 “About the Recognition of South Ossetia as an Independent State”, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation,
No. 1261, August 26, 2008 http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=047560 (accessed September 11, 2008).
16 “About the Recognition of Abkhazia as an Independent State”, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No.
1260, August 26, 2008 http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=047559 (accessed September 11, 2008).
17 For detailed information about the siloviki and Putin’s government read Brian Whitmore, “Inside The Corporation: Russia’s
Power Elite”, RFE/RL, October 15, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1078958.html (accessed September 11, 2008) .
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As a result, Russia became a super-centralised state without any local self-government. All important
decisions were made by Putin and his team, a group of KGB veterans. The eminence grise of Yeltsin’s
Russia, the so-called oligarchs, lost their influence and power. Rebel oligarchs such as oil company
Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky were either jailed or expelled from the country. The others chose
loyalty and cooperation with the authorities.18
With the presidential elections drawing closer, rivalry among the siloviki intensified, as many of them
were vying to succeed Putin. Although Putin was their undisputed leader, the siloviki obviously lacked
unity, largely due to their competing business interests.19  Russia’s bitter historical experience only
fuelled tensions among them: losing power in Russia almost invariably means losing property.
The Kremlin considered two main options: granting a third presidential term for Putin (with respective
constitutional amendments) or electing one of the first vice premiers, Sergey Ivanov or Dimitry
Medvedev, as president. Dimitry Medvedev was chosen as Putin and his team regarded Medvedev as
a lesser threat; unlike Ivanov, he had never held any positions in the military, police or security
structures. Apart from being a vice-premier, Medvedev simultaneously chaired the Russian energy
giant “Gazprom”.
In May 2008, after the inauguration of the new president, Vladimir Putin took the post of prime
minister while Dimitry Medvedev began building his own team. There was a lot of speculation both
in Moscow and abroad about the emergence of a dual-power system in Russia.20  The Russian business
elite was affected too as businessmen were trying to understand the new situation and side with the
right party.
Quite a few analysts and commentators argued that Medvedev was in favour of close cooperation with
the West, and that during his presidency Russian foreign policy would rely mainly on economic tools.
In contrast, Putin and his “old guard” were believed to support gunboat diplomacy aiming to restore
Russia’s former prestige and glory.
The most vivid indication of the growing rift between Medvedev’s and Putin’s teams came on July 24,
2008, at a meeting between Vladimir Putin and owners of Russia’s leading metallurgical works. The
prime minister publicly accused the owners of one of the plants, Mechel, of price-fixing and “advised”
the investigation committee to probe into the case. On July 31, President Medvedev responded to Putin’s
outburst at this meeting with a public statement insisting that law-enforcement authorities and govern-
mental officials should stop creating “nightmarish conditions” for Russian businesses.21
Putin’s visit to China was another symbolic message to the world, designed to demonstrate who really
was in charge in Russia and who the West should talk to. The Russian prime minister attended the
opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics alongside other world leaders, while Medvedev was absent
on TV screens; he was on vacation.
When the war broke out in Georgia, Putin immediately left Beijing and flew to the North Ossetian
capital, Vladikavkaz. He gave orders there as if he, not Medvedev, were the commander-in-chief.22  By
winning the war and raising the prestige of the Russian military and security institutions, Putin left
18 Marshall I. Goldman, “Putin and the Oligarchs”, Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
20041101faessay83604/marshall-i-goldman/putin-and-the-oligarchs.html (accessed September 8, 2008).
19 Brian Whitmore, “Russia: as elections near, rivalries in Putin circle heat up”, RFE/RL, October 15, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/
content/article/1078960.html (accessed September 8, 2008).
20 “The odd couple”, The Economist, July 10, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11708197
(accessed September 9, 2008).
21 Jonas Bernstein, “Prime-minister dominates economic, foreign and security policies”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 5,
Number 150, The Jamestown Foundation, August 6, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373290 (ac-
cessed September 5, 2008).
22 “War shows that Putin is running things in Russia”, NPR, August 15, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=93616167 (accessed September 11, 2008).
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no room for doubt as to who really runs Russia and which group will determine the country’s future
for years to come: these are Vladimir Putin and his fellow siloviki, respectively.23
1.1.3 Individual level
To have a better understanding of Russia’s foreign policy in general, and its attitude towards Georgia
in particular, it is necessary to look at Vladimir Putin’s mindset and values.
Putin’s views and his outlook on the world in general were shaped by his experience as a KGB
officer. Antagonistic and black-and-white thinking is the hallmark of the Russian security service.24  He
and his fellow KGB men began their careers under the legendary Yuri Andropov. In their view, it was
Yuri Andropov who sought to reform the Soviet economy and maintain the leading role of the security
services in the country. Not by chance, a monument to Andropov was put up in Petrozavodsk during
Putin’s tenure, in 2004.25  Putin’s utterance that the break-up of the Soviet Union was the “greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the century” can serve as a vivid illustration of his vision for Russia’s role
and place in the world.26
Putin’s dislike of Georgia and the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili dates back to 2004. The
president who came to power on the back of the Rose Revolution and was labelled a “US agent” by
the state-controlled Russian media, He was unacceptable to the Russian leadership.27  Saakashvili has
become a symbol of the post-Soviet “colour revolutions”. The young Georgian president openly backed
similar revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, further infuriating Moscow.
The CIS summit in the fall of 2004 provided the opportunity for the newly elected Georgian president
Mikheil Saakashvili and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to meet each other. At a joint press
conference, Putin and Saakashvili openly clashed over the problem of Georgia’s territorial integrity,
something unprecedented in the history of the CIS.28  Saakashvili became the main pro-American
leader in the CIS, on territory that Russia has always viewed as its backyard.
Putin’s irritation became stronger after the Georgian president publicly dubbed him “Lilliputin”,29  a
clear hint at the Russian president’s physique. (Vladimir Putin is a rather short man.) Many prominent
pundits pointed out that Russian-Georgian relations were gradually turning into a personal feud be-
tween Putin and Saakashvili. In their opinion, Russian policy on Georgia was often influenced by
Putin’s personal animosity towards Saakashvili.30
This antipathy and the desire to take revenge were accompanied by Putin’s ambition to build up
personal glory and assert his leadership in Russia. The war with Georgia provided Vladimir Putin with
a good opportunity to achieve both goals.
23 Ivan Sukhov, “Russia: how the new ‘cold war’ plays at home”, Open Democracy, August 29, 2008, http://
www.opendemocracy.net/Russia/article/Russia-how-the-new-cold-war-plays-at-home (accessed September 10, 2008).
24 To learn how the experience of work in the Russian security service affects the political leadership’s mindset in contem-
porary Russia read Robert Coalson, “Russia: Why The Chekist Mind-Set Matters”, RFE/RL, October 15, 2007, http://
www.rferl.org/content/article/1078954.html (accessed September 11, 2008).
25 Brian Whitmore, “Inside The Corporation: Russia’s Power Elite”, RFE/RL, October 15, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/
Article/1078958.html (accessed September 11, 2008).
26 V.V.Putin, “Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, April 25, 2005, http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/
2005/04/25/1223_type63372type63374type82634_87049.shtml (accessed September 11, 2008).
27 Owen Matthews, “Why puppetmaster Putin is more dangerous than ever”, The Daily Mail, August 12, 2008, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1043684/Why-puppetmaster-Putin-dangerous-ever.html (accessed September 9, 2008).
28 CIS Summit reveals rift in Russian-Georgian Relations, Civil Georgia, September 17, 2004, http://www.civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=7852&search= (accessed September 13, 2008).
29 Zygmunt Dzieciolowski, “Georgia’s President Saakashvili, on the eve of war”, Open Democracy, August 11, 2008, http:/
/www.opendemocracy.net/russia/article/georgias-president-saakashvili-on-the-eve-of-war (accessed September 8, 2008).
30 Yulia Latinina, “Looking Into Saakashvili’s Caucasus Soul”, The Moscow Times, August 20, 2008, http://
www.themoscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/370026.htm (accessed September 8, 2008).
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1.1.4 Influence
The Russian military intervention in Georgia led the world to reinterpret Moscow’s foreign policy goals,
and to reconsider Russia’s place in the international system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some
in the West believed that Russia would develop into a democratic country. They also thought that Putin’s
assertive foreign policy was more or less appropriate for an economically ascendant country. Russia
became a member of the G7, an informal grouping of leading industrial countries (now G8), and Russian
companies were listed in major foreign stock exchanges. Russia also emerged as a major player in world
energy markets, with the EU heavily reliant on Russian oil and gas supplies.
The Russian economy was the first to feel the negative effect of the military aggression. According
to various estimates, several billions USD in foreign investment capital fled Russia, the benchmark
Russian Trading System (RTS) stock index dropped to its lowest level, and several of the biggest
foreign investors pulled out of the country. The central bank of Russia had to pour a huge amount
of cash into the money markets to keep the Russian rouble from falling.31
Apart from the economic damage, Russia is facing military fall-out from the war. The Central Euro-
pean and Baltic states are seeking to strengthen their military ties with Washington. After the Russian
invasion of Georgia, Poland rushed to sign a deal with the USA to place elements of the US missile
defence system on Polish soil.32  Other Eastern European countries are expected to follow suit. Fol-
lowing the conflict, the US and NATO naval presence in the Black Sea has become almost permanent,
leaving Russia seething with anger.33  Meanwhile, the Pentagon promised to do its best to help rebuild
the Georgian armed forces.34  It cannot be ruled out that Georgia will upgrade its military cooperation
with the USA and NATO in the near future.
American and EU leaders openly censured Moscow for its actions in Georgia and suggested that
Russia may face international isolation.35  Their critical attitude may become even stronger in the
future. The European Union is likely to step up its efforts to develop alternative energy transit routes
(see below). The USA suspended its civilian nuclear cooperation deal with Moscow. In addition,
Russia’s bid to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is now in question.36  Russian economic
growth will certainly slow down.
Russia failed to secure the support of CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Despite the
Kremlin’s pressure, no member of the CIS, a Russia-controlled alliance, has recognised the indepen-
dence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia so far.37  The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an alliance of
31 “The Outflow of Foreign Capital from Russia Prompts the Banks to Limit Credit”, Liga Novosti, September 10, 2008,
http://news.liga.net/smi/NP080736.html (accessed September 12, 2008); “Russia’s Foreign Capital Reserves Lost Nine Billion
Dollars in a Week”, Vremya Novostei, September 11, 2008. http://vremya.ru/news/1021119.html (accessed September 11,
2008); Charles Clover and Peter Garnham, “Moscow forced to shore up rouble”, Financial Times, September 4, 2008, http:/
/www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a56c6662-7ab7-11dd-adbe-000077b07658.html (accessed September 12, 2008).
32 Thom Shanker and Nicholas Kulish , “Poland-U.S. missile deal draws anger from Russia”, International Herald Tribune,
August 15, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/15/europe/missile.php (accessed September 12, 2008).
33 Andrew E. Kramer, “NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia”, The New York Times, August 27, 2008, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/world/europe/28russia.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (accessed September 12, 2008).
34 “Pentagon set on mission to rebuild Georgian military”, Yahoo News, September 9, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/
20080909/pl_afp/georgiarussiaconflictusmilitary_080909200602 (accessed September 12, 2008).
35 “Rice: U.S. and Europe must stand up to Russia together”, Speech at German Marshall Fund, September 18 http://
www.gmfus.org/event/rice-russia.cfm (accessed September 21, 2008) “Miliband warns over Russia crisis”, BBC News, August
28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7585527.stm (accessed September 12, 2008); Omid Ghoreishi, “EU
Criticizes Russia, Postpones Partnership Talks”, The Epoch Times, September 1, 2008, http://en.epochtimes.com/n2/world/eu-
criticizes-russia-3680.html (accessed September 12, 2008).
36 “Russian deputy PM dismayed by lack of progress in WTO talks”, RIA Novosti, September 5, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/world/
20080905/116572584.html (accessed September 5, 2008).
37 «Leaders of OCST Condemned Georgia but Stopped Short of Recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Said They
Would Decide on the Matter on Their Own”, Newsru.com, September 5, 2008, http://newsru.com/russia/05sep2008/sami.html
(accessed September 12, 2008); “The Silence of the Allies”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 4, 2008, http://www.ng.ru/
politics/2008-09-04/1_silence.html (accessed September 7, 2008).
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several CIS countries, Russia, and China, also refrained from endorsing the birth of the two indepen-
dent republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, largely due to China’s cautious position.38  The Russian
invasion of Georgia will certainly make CIS countries more wary of Moscow’s intentions. In the long
term each of them – especially those facing the danger of separatism on their own territories – will
seek alternative alliances.
1.2. Soviet successor states and main powers
The reactions of the CIS countries, the US and the European Union to the Russian military aggression
against Georgia and the likely impact of the war on their future policies are examined bellow.
1.2.1 CIS
Following the military conflict with Georgia, Russian president Dimitry Medvedev defined the Kremlin’s
new foreign policy principles. Among them, he stated that the former Soviet republics were in the
sphere of Russia’s “privileged interests”. In fact, Moscow made it clear to the West that following the
Russian-Georgian war, it would not tolerate western attempts to limit its influence in what Russia sees
as its backyard, first of all in the CIS.39
During the conflict and in the post-conflict period, a majority of CIS countries abstained from any
harsh statements and instead adopted a wait-and-see approach. They now fear that they too may come
under Russian pressure, and may even become the next target of Russian aggression if Moscow
perceives them as excessively pro-western. The Russian-Georgian war only underscored that Moscow
has quite powerful leverage at its disposal.
Russia argued that it had to send troops to Georgia to protect its citizens there. This argument is
reflected in Russia’s new foreign policy principles, which state that Moscow’s “unquestionable
priority” is to protect the life and interests of Russian citizens in every country. The Russian-
Georgian war has created a precedent for such Russian intervention in any post-Soviet country with
ethnic Russian enclaves.40
The Russian military attack against Georgia aimed to undermine the Caucasus country’s reputation as
a safe alternative transit route for Caspian energy. Russia views pipelines on Georgian territory41  as
a threat to its national interests. The war in Georgia was in fact Moscow’s message for oil- and gas-
rich Caspian countries that Russia opposes any alternative routes and wants oil and gas to get to the
West only through Russian territory.
The attitude of the CIS countries towards the Russian-Georgian war reflects the degree of their loyalty
to the Kremlin. At a meeting in Moscow on September 5, the signatories to the CIS Collective
Security Agreement – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Armenia – backed,
albeit without much enthusiasm, Moscow’s policy in Georgia. In the final declaration of the meeting
they endorsed Russia’s actions but stopped short of recognising the independence of the separatist
regions,42  indicating that they were not fully under Russian control.
38 Russia: The kremlin tries to put on brave face following diplomatic slap over georgia, EurasiaNet.Org, August 28, 2008,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav082808b.shtml (accessed September 12, 2008).
39 Paul Reynolds, ”New Russian world order: the five principles”, BBC, September 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
7591610.stm (accessed September 8, 2008).
40 Ethnic Russians constitute 29.9% of the total population in Kazakhstan, 17.3% in Ukraine, 11.4% in Belarus, 5.9% in
Moldova, 28.0% in Latvia, 25.6% in Estonia, and 5.2% in Lithuania. “Cold comfort”, The Economist, September 4, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12052710 (accessed September 8, 2008).
41 Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline.
42 “Russia’s Partners in OCST Postponed Decision on the Status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, Izvestia, 5.09.08, http://
www.izvestia.ru/news/news187394 (accessed September 5, 2008); Marina Perevozkina, “Moscow’s Tough Stance Encouraged the
Allies”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.09.08, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2008-09-06/100_odkb.html?mthree=1 (accessed September 9, 2008).
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1.2.1.1 Central Asia
For the landlocked and energy-rich Central Asian states, Georgia is an important alternative route for
sending their oil and gas to western markets while bypassing Russia. As the West’s position is still
weak in the region compared with Russian influence, the balance is still tipped in favour of the
Russian routes. That is why it is crucial for Central Asian countries to maintain loyalty to Moscow.
If Russia’s aggressive actions lower western influence in Georgia, the Central Asian republics will
become more pro-Russian. Several factors are important from this viewpoint.
Firstly, by waging a war against Georgia, Russia in fact warned the Central Asian countries that any
attempt to transit energy past Russian territory would be considered by the Kremlin as an anti-Russian
policy. If the West fails to secure the Georgian route for energy transits, Central Asian states will
become more dependent on Russia. In the wake of the Russian-Georgian war, on September 2,
Vladimir Putin was quick to visit Uzbekistan to assure leaders there that Moscow was willing and
able to buy its energy resources at European prices. Earlier, a similar agreement had been reached
with Turkmenistan.43
Secondly, if the Georgian crisis deepens, the credibility of the West (and especially the USA) as a
reliable partner for Central Asian states will be damaged. Today, Central Asian autocratic governments
– including Uzbekistan – cooperate with the US in one way or another. But if Georgia becomes
weaker, their “excessive friendship” with the West may end in failure, especially as the West is far
from happy with their poor human rights records and authoritarian leaderships. If so, Central Asian
leaders (who are famous for their political pragmatism) may prefer warm relations with Russia – even
though it may increase their dependence on Moscow – to risky cooperation with the West.
Thirdly, the Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Russia was willing and ready to use military
force against other countries under the pretext of defending its citizens there. This message is espe-
cially disturbing for Kazakhstan, where one third of the population has a Russian ethnic background.
Besides, Central Asian countries face additional dangers as they too have autonomous republics and
ethnic enclaves.44  Moscow has successfully tested the “Georgian scenario” (distribution of Russian
passports preceding military intervention to protect Russian citizens) and can now use it against
ethnically mixed Central Asian states if they are not loyal enough.
Despite Russian pressure, Central Asian republics are unlikely to recognise Abkhazia’s and South
Ossetia’s independence in the near future. But their support for alternative pipelines will weaken and
remain lukewarm until the European Union and US successfully counter Russia’s military ambitions
in Georgia and build new pipelines on Georgian territory to bypass Russia.
1.2.1.2 Belarus
Russia had no doubts that Belarus would support its military operation in Georgia. However, the
Byelorussian president Alexander Lukashenko was noticeably silent in the first days of the conflict,
prompting accusations of “treachery” from Moscow. Lukashenko welcomed Russia’s decision to recognise
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but stopped short of doing the same. His reluctance
to recognise the separatist regions as independent states was viewed as a positive signal in western
capitals. The first signs of rapprochement between Belarus and the West are already evident. Western
governments announced that visa regime with Belarus would be eased, the European Union agreed to
hold talks with the Byelorussian foreign minister, and the USA suggested that sanctions against
Byelorussian companies could be lifted.45
43 “Russia and Uzbekistan Agreed that Gas Prices Would Be on the European Level”, RIA Novosti , 2.09.08.
44 There are large Uzbek communities in Tajikistan and Kirgyzstan, while ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan. Besides,
Karakalpak people, who are ethnically and linguistically different from the Uzbeks, live in western Uzbekistan.
45 David Marples, “Belarus responds cautiously to Georgian crisis”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 2, 2008, http://
www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2373335 (accessed September 10, 2008).
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The heightened tensions between Russia and the West triggered by the Russian-Georgian conflict gave
Belarus significant room for manoeuvre in its foreign relations. Despite Lukashenko’s authoritarian
style of leadership, the West seems to have realised that further isolation of Minsk will only strengthen
Moscow’s position in Belarus. While Russia continues to bring pressure to bear on the Belorussian
authorities, Minsk will recognise the independence of the separatist republics only if western powers
continue to isolate Belarus.46
1.2.1.3 Armenia
Among Russia’s allies it was Armenia that suffered the greatest impact from the Russian-Georgian
war. Due to the ongoing blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Georgia is seen by Yerevan
as vital link between that country and the rest of the world.47  When Russian troops destroyed a key
railway bridge in Georgia, Armenia was quick to send materials and engineers to assist the reconstruc-
tion of the bridge.48
The war posed a foreign policy dilemma for Armenia. As Moscow’s most faithful ally in the region,
Armenia was expected to endorse the Russian aggression against Georgia. But its heavy reliance on
Georgia as a crucial transport link to reach the outer world caused Yerevan to adopt a more moderate
position in order to avoid irritating Tbilisi. Despite strong pressure from Moscow, it was only on
August 13 that the Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian phoned Dimitry Medvedev to praise Russia’s
efforts to bring “stability” to the region. However, he refused to recognise the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.49
The Russian-Georgian war may become an important milestone for Armenian foreign policy. Russia’s
recognition of two breakaway republics in the South Caucasus has serious implications for the prob-
lem of Nagorno-Karabakh. During the Russian-Georgian confrontation, Yerevan called for the peaceful
resolution of the conflict. The Armenian leadership hopes that Azerbaijan will learn the Georgian
lesson and never attempt to restore its territorial integrity by force, while the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia may pave the way for recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Russian-Georgian conflict convinced Yerevan that it was time to normalise relations with Turkey
and set aside its historical grudges. “Football diplomacy” reached a new level in Armenia on Septem-
ber 6, when the national teams of Armenia and Turkey met for their first-ever match in a World Cup
qualifier in the Armenian capital.50  The Turkish leader’s unprecedented visit to Yerevan and his talks
with Serzh Sarkisian raised hopes of better relations between the two countries, although there is still
a long way to go.
If Armenian-Turkish relations improve, Georgia will become more vulnerable to Russian pressure. If
Armenia can use alternative transport routes, Moscow may stop all transits (including natural gas) via
Georgia and put Tbilisi under increased pressure.
46 From this viewpoint, it is important that Moscow has already announced that the price of Russian gas for Belarus will
remain unchanged and offered a $2 billion loan to Minsk.
47 According to the Armenian official sources, the Russian-Georgian war inflicted $680 million losses on Armenia’s national
economy. Almost 70% of Armenia’s foreign trade go through Georgian ports and railway/motorway networks. Hovannes
Shoghikian, “Armenia claims huge losses from Georgian crisis”, Armenialiberty, September 3, 2008, http://
www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2008/09/78A3F6D5-0F3E-4908-911D-B91CE3CD6312.ASP (accessed Septem-
ber 4, 2008).
48 Shakeh Avoyan, “Armenia scrambles to restore vital supplies via Georgia”, August 18, 2008, http://www.armenialiberty.org/
armeniareport/report/en/2008/08/F3509195-D04E-4187-AA45-23B61ACF430F.asp, (accessed September 19, 2008).
49 Hovannes Shoghikian, “Russia seeks Armenian recognition of Georgian regions”, Armenialiberty, September 3, 2008, http:/
/www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2008/09/93D9ECA8-7301-4920-BF20-9056B6124D20.ASP (accessed Septem-
ber 4, 2008).
50 Emil Danielyan, “Armenia, Turkey ease tensions after historic Erevan summit”, Armenialiberty, September 8, 2008, http:/
/www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2008/09/640B3F40-F23A-443D-8CB7-A8F24A7FD6E8.ASP (accessed September
9, 2008).
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1.2.1.4 Azerbaijan
In the first days of the war Azerbaijan declared that regaining the lost territories by military force was
the right solution. Later, however, Baku refrained from such statements, apparently trying to avoid
irking Russia. Two aspects of the Russian-Georgian war are important for Azerbaijan.
Firstly, if Tbilisi had succeeded in bringing South Ossetia back into the fold, Azerbaijan would have
had a stronger argument for resolving the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh by military means. Azerbaijan’s
defence budget is increasing year by year, and a military solution to the Karabakh problem is a
popular talking point for the Azerbaijani political elite. But the Georgian experience is likely to
discourage Baku from using its armed forces to regain Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku understands that the
Russian-Georgian war is a good illustration of what a military conflict with Russia’s ally may entail.
At the same time, Georgia’s failure to restore its territorial integrity by force has eased the pressure
from political hawks and hundreds of thousands of refugees on Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev.
Secondly, the conflict may urge Azerbaijan to revise its foreign policy if the West, and especially the
US, fails to protect Georgia from the Russian aggression and fails to provide the country with strong
economic and military assistance in the post-war period. If so, Ilham Aliyev could find it advantageous
to strengthen ties with Moscow. The fact that Aliyev’s talks with US vice president Dick Cheney
ended without any specific results is one of the indications that Azerbaijan has resorted to a wait-and-
see policy; Aliyev had a telephone conversation with Dimitry Medvedev after the talks.51
1.2.1.5 Moldova
Having waged war on Georgia, the Kremlin may now want to use the Trans-Dniester problem in
Moldova to improve its tarnished reputation and teach the West a lesson in the “peaceful resolution”
of conflicts. Even before the Russian-Georgian war, the Russian president held separate meetings with
the leaders of Moldova and Trans-Dniester, Vladimir Voronin and Igor Smirnov, and may soon host
a face-to-face meeting between them. Moscow again appears willing to broker the so-called Kozak
peace plan, which was rejected by Voronin several years ago, largely due to western pressure. In
return for its mediation in settling the conflict, the Kremlin wants Moldova to declare political
neutrality, grant the Trans-Dniester region wide autonomy, and agree to a Russian military presence
in Trans-Dniester for at least 20 years.52  On the one hand, Chisinau’s consent to the plan may create
the illusion that the conflict is resolved. On the other hand, however, it may transform Moldova into
a Russian stronghold in the heart of Europe. Moscow would be able to claim that loyalty to Russia
is a sine qua non for the settlement of “frozen conflicts” and use this argument as a trump card
against the West.
1.2.1.6 Ukraine
Ukraine was the only CIS country to really confront Moscow as a sign of solidarity with Georgia.
Kiev limited the freedom of movement of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol.53  Besides,
in a move regarded as hostile by Moscow, the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko visited Tbilisi
at the height of the conflict to demonstrate his support.
Ukraine’s position stemmed from Kiev’s pro-western policies and the personal friendship
between Viktor Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili. Yushchenko’s political team and western
51 ”Azerbaijan: Baku officials, US diplomats deny Cheney blow-up”, Eurasia Insight, September 10, 2008, http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091008a.shtml (accessed September 11, 2008).
52 Igor Glanin, “Talks Enforcement”, Vremia Novostey, 4.09.08, http://www.vremya.ru/2008/162/4/211962.html (accessed Sep-
tember 4, 2008).
53 “Yushchenko decrees restrict Russian fleet”, Ukrainian Journal, August 13, 2008, http://www.ukrainianjournal.com/
index.php?w=article&id=6989 (accessed 14 August, 2008).
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political circles are well aware that after the Russian military operation against Georgia,
Ukraine may become the next target for Russia; Moscow is furious at Kiev’s plans to join
NATO in the future.
Due to several factors, however, Ukraine’s position has weakened in the post-conflict period.
Firstly, many people living in Ukraine are against Ukraine’s membership in NATO and favour
closer ties with Russia.54  There are deep political divisions between the western and eastern
parts of the country. The Russian political elite, which is seeking to restore Russia’s former
dominance and strength, threatened that if Ukraine moved closer to the West, eastern and
southern Ukrainian regions would inevitably secede from the rest of the country.55  Russian
politicians have made repeated public statements that Russia should reclaim Crimea. Moscow
mayor Yuri Luzhkov is the most vocal proponent of this idea, calling Sevastopol a “Moscow
region”.56  Angered by his remarks, Kiev has banned Luzhkov from travelling to Ukraine. If the
position of the West weakens in Georgia, and if Viktor Yushchenko continues his anti-Russian
rhetoric and pro-NATO course, Russia will encourage separatist tendencies in Ukraine – begin-
ning in Crimea, home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. According to the Ukrainian foreign ministry,
the Russian consulate has begun issuing Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in Simferopol
without the Ukrainian government’s approval.57  Russia may “punish” Kiev for disloyalty by
sending its troops to Ukraine under the pretext of defending its citizens there, on the basis of
its new foreign policy principles.
Secondly, even if Russian aggression fails to succeed in Georgia, Ukraine’s pro-western president is
likely to face serious political challenges at home. Prime minister Yulia Timoshenko, once a political
ally of the president, is accused by Yushchenko’s team of siding with the pro-Russian opposition and
of working in Russia’s interests in a bid to become president. Tymoshenko is said to have strong
presidential ambitions, counting on Moscow’s support in next year’s Ukrainian presidential election.58
If the West’s positions in Georgia remain strong, Moscow will try to undermine Kiev’s pro-western
course anyway and try to instigate political turmoil in Ukraine.
1.2.2 The United States of America
1.2.2.1 International system level
During the Russian-Georgian conflict, the US preferred to focus mainly on humanitarian aid to Geor-
gia and criticizing Russia’s actions, giving the European Union a free hand in mediating a ceasefire
agreement between Russia and Georgia.59  Washington chose this approach largely due to Moscow’s
position; the Kremlin openly accused the USA of instigating the conflict in South Ossetia and sup-
54 Andreas Umland, “Ukraine, NATO, and German Foreign Policy: Berlin and Russian Interests in the Former USSR”,
American Chronicle, April 20, 2008, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/59200 (accessed 10 May, 2008).
55 In Vladimir Putin’s opinion, Ukraine is not a full-fledged state yet. He warned that if Ukraine were granted MAP at the
NATO summit in Bucharest the country would fall apart. According to some diplomatic sources, Putin told the US president
George Bush that Ukraine was not a state at all. “Putin Hints At Splitting Up Ukraine”, The Moscow Times, April 8, 2008,
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/361701.htm (accessed 6 September, 2008).
56 Andrey Kurkov, “Is Ukraine next?”, New Statesman, September 4, 2008, http://www.newstatesman.com/europe/2008/09/
russia-ukraine-georgia (accessed September 19, 2008).
57 Svetlana Gamova, “Passports May Become the Reason of Beating in Crimea”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta 08.09.2008, http://
www.ng.ru/week/2008-09-08/12_sng.html?mthree=2 (accessed September 9, 2008).
58 Graham Stack, “Ukraine in suspense over Tymoshenko`s NATO position”, Russia Profile, September 8, 2008, http://
www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Business+New+Europe&articleid=a1220858884 (accessed 9 September 2008).
59 Immediately after the end of hostilities, USA sent $38 million worth of aid to Georgia to address the country’s humani-
tarian needs. US transport aircraft carried out 62 humanitarian flights from August 13 to September 4. Besides, three
American warships arrived in Georgian ports with humanitarian missions. Daniel Fried, “The Current Situation in Georgia
and Implications for U.S. Policy”, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Department of State,
September 9, 2008, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/109345.htm (accessed September 10, 2008).
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porting Georgia.60  This suggests that Russia would have hardly agreed to American mediation and
there would have been fewer chances of the conflict ending soon.
Washington’s actions at the international level were determined by several factors.
Firstly, following the fall of the Soviet Union, America has made persistent efforts to promote democ-
racy and a free market economy in Soviet successor states, something viewed in Moscow as an
attempt to curb Russia’s influence in its own backyard. From this viewpoint, it is important to recall
US president George Bush’s statement during his visit to Tbilisi in 2005 in which he called Georgia
a “beacon of liberty and democracy” for the world, and especially for the region.61
Secondly, Georgia plays a pivotal role in the US administration’s energy policy. Thanks to Washington’s
support, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline were con-
structed in the 1990s as a way to deliver gas and oil to European markets without transiting Russia
or Iran. Moscow believed that these projects were designed to weaken Russian influence in the region
and to reduce the West’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. If the West is able to maintain its
positions in Georgia and prevent further Russian military aggression against the country, the western
policy of diversification of energy sources will get a serious boost. But if the USA takes a passive
position, energy-rich Caspian countries will hardly support transit projects on Georgian territory, trying
to avoid confrontation with Russia.
Thirdly, it is a matter of prestige for the US to defend the “beacon of democracy” from new Russian
aggressions. Georgia is seen as America’s reliable partner (before the war its military contingent in Iraq
was the third largest after those of the US and Great Britain). The Georgian political elite is distinctly
pro-western and especially pro-American. If Russian influence increases in Georgia, US international
prestige will be damaged, and CIS countries will become more wary of cooperation with the USA.
1.2.2.2 Domestic policy level
For the first time in the history of US presidential campaigns, the problem of Georgia has become
a domestic political issue. Both presidential hopefuls – Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack
Obama – voiced support for Georgia. The McCain campaign even accused Obama of being too soft
on Russia.62  US lawmakers and politicians from across the American political spectrum agree that the
need to protect Georgia is one of the top priorities of US foreign policy. This issue will remain on
the agenda regardless of who becomes the next US president. There is also bi-partisan support in the
USA for the administration’s plan to provide economic and military aid to Georgia.63
1.2.2.3 Individual level
The current US administration has a special attitude towards Georgia. It was during George Bush’s
presidency that the Rose Revolution happened in the country and vital reforms were implemented with
Washington’s support. That is why a failure of White House policy in Georgia will be seen as a blow
to George Bush in the last days of his political career. It means that the current US administration
has a strong motivation to support Georgia.
60 Steven Lee Myers, “US to Announce $1 Billion Georgia Aid Package”, The New York Times, September 3, 2008, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/world/europe/04cheney.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin (accessed September 3, 2008).
61 Office of the Press Secretary, May 10, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050510-2.html (accessed
on May 11, 2005).
62 Ewen MacAskill, “US election: Republican catches fire as McCain`s ex-rivals delivers speeches critical of Obama”,
Guardian, September 4, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/04/uselections2008.republicans20086 (accessed Sep-
tember 4, 2008).
63 Heather Maher, “Congress questions Bush officials on Georgian aid, response to Russia”, RFE/RL, September 10, 2008,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Congress_Questions_Bush_Officials_On_Georgian_Aid_Response_To_Russia_/1197713.html (accessed
September 10, 2008).
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1.2.2.4 Influence
If Washington’s policy is successful in Georgia, i.e. if Russian troops are pulled out of the buffer zone,
Georgia’s government system and national economy remain functional, and democratic processes con-
tinue unabated, US influence in the region will increase substantially, nearby countries will be more
willing to cooperate with the US, and prospects of alternative energy transit projects will improve.
But if Washington’s policy fails, the USA will no longer be viewed as a reliable partner, its interna-
tional prestige will be harmed, and its influence in the region will decline. The outlook for alternative
energy transit projects will become gloomier and Russia’s role in the region, and in the world in
general, will grow.
1.2.3 The European Union
1.2.3.1 International system level
The European Union’s policy on Georgia is largely influenced by the attitude of its leading members
towards Russia. The European Union carefully measured its support for Georgia to make sure that its
actions did not anger Moscow too much. The EU preferred a moderate position on Georgia and to
cooperate with the country in less politicised areas, whereas NATO’s every move or decision regarding
Georgia was invariably seen as a hostile act.
Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is a decisive factor in the European Union’s policy.64  The
European Union, especially its old members, thought that it would be unreasonable to put its relation-
ship with Moscow at risk because of the Georgian crisis. However, after Russian troops invaded
Georgian territories, especially those outside the conflict zones, and after Moscow recognised the
separatist regions as independent on August 26, the European Union decided to revise its relations
with Russia. The European Union made it clear that there would no business as usual with Russia
until Russian troops had fully pulled out of Georgia.65
The new EU members, especially Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, which are much more fearful
of Russian aggression than other EU members are, gave the strongest support to Georgia. Sweden and
the UK sided with them and called for tough sanctions on Russia. In contrast, Italy took a much softer
position and objected to sanctions on Moscow.66  France and Germany proposed to increase assistance
to Georgia instead of imposing sanctions on Russia.67  The difference of opinion among individual EU
states was the main factor that led the European Union to adopt a balanced approach: on the one hand,
no sanctions were imposed on Russia in order to keep the door open for cooperation with Moscow; on
the other hand, EU-Georgia relations were enhanced, albeit without promises of eventual membership.
1.2.3.2 Domestic policy level
In the UK, unlike other EU states, the Russian military intervention in Georgia became a domestic
political issue. David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party, was the first British politician
64 Dependence of the leading EU member states on Russian gas and oil, according to 2006 statistical data: France: natural
gas – 23%, oil – 15%; Germany: natural gas – 40%, oil – 34%; Italy: natural gas – 32%, oil – 23%. Some EU countries
are 100% dependent on Russian gas, for instance Bulgaria, Slovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Enoi Wogr,
2006, http://www.eni.it/; Eurostat, http://www.eurostat.com/.
65 No more business as usual?”, The Economist, August 19, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11955660&source=features_box_main (accessed 20
August, 2008).
66 “Italy’s Frattini on South Ossetia Crisis: ‘Mistake To Keep Russia Out’ of WTO,” Official website of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Italy, http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Home.htm.
67 “EU reaches out to Georgia but membership not on the cards”, EUbusiness, September 2, 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/
news-eu/1220359623.06 (accessed September 2, 2008).
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to visit Georgia after the war. He arrived in Tbilisi on August 16 to voice strong support for
Georgia on behalf of the UK government and the British opposition.68  During the crisis Prime
Minister Gordon Brown was on vacation,69  while the Foreign Secretary visited Georgia only on
August 19.70  The British political elite’s unanimous stance on the Russian-Georgian conflict sug-
gests that support for Georgia will remain one of the priorities of London’s foreign policy for some
time to come.
1.2.3.3 Individual level
The European Union’s passive position during such a serious international crisis would be a clear
indication of its weakness. Today the EU has assumed the role of chief mediator in the conflict,
largely due to the “personal factor”. Immediately after taking office, Nicolas Sarkozy showed his
determination to address various international crises in the world. His direct involvement helped free
hostages in Libya and Columbia. But the Russian-Georgian war was a different challenge for the
French leader. The fact that Mr. Sarkozy, the current president of the European Union, stepped in to
broker a ceasefire agreement in the first days of war suggests that it was a matter of prestige for him
to settle the crisis.
1.2.3.4 Influence
The Russian-Georgian conflict will increase the engagement of the European Union in Georgia. Con-
sequently, it will be able to play a greater role in the South Caucasus. The European Union’s large-
scale economic and political support for Georgia and closer EU-Georgia ties will help the country
recover from the conflict quickly, while the EU’s international prestige will grow considerably.
Diversification of energy sources has become an urgent theme for the European Union, an aspect
reflected in the final resolution of the EU summit on September 1. The Russian-Georgian war high-
lighted the danger of Russia’s intentions to monopolise energy transits from Asia to Europe. It is very
likely, therefore, that the West will begin lobbying for alternative gas and oil pipelines (foremost the
Nabucco pipeline) more actively.71
1.3 Georgia
The events of August 2008 changed the political situation in Georgia dramatically. There are no
Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts any longer, as they effectively mutated into a wider
Georgian-Russian confrontation. The problem of Georgia’s territorial integrity has become the question
of national sovereignty as the Georgian government controls less territory today than it did before the
escalation of conflict. Georgia’s image as an “efficient state” was shattered and the country may
plunge into new internal political turmoil. Georgia’s future depends on international security guaran-
tees and support as never before.
1.3.1 Implications of the war for the breakaway regions
After the August 2008 crisis it has become clear that a direct dialogue between the conflicting parties
(Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia) is highly unlikely. It is especially relevant to South Ossetia,
as its rulers are closely connected with Russian military circles, while unification with North Ossetia seems
68 “British Conservative Leader in Tbilisi”, Civil Georgia, August 16, 2008, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19175&search=Cameron
(accessed 13 September, 2008).
69 “Lost in the Caucasus”, The Economist, August 21, 2008, http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11965231
(accessed 13 September, 2008).
70 “British Foreign Secretary Visits Georgia”, Civil Georgia, August 19, 2008, http://civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=19217&search=Miliband%20visit%20Georgia (accessed 13 September, 2008).
71 “Nabucco pipeline ‘on track’ despite Georgia-Russia conflict”, EUbusiness, September 5, 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/
news-eu/1220572922.8/ (accessed September 10, 2008)
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a more attractive option for local residents than does independence. So the de facto annexation of South
Ossetia may soon become de jure and the region will be simply incorporated into the Russian Federation.72
At the same time, it is a paradox that South Ossetia has become independent while North Ossetia remains
part of Russia. It will be interesting to see how Moscow will sort out this problem.
As for Abkhazia, part of its ruling elite is strongly in favour of independence and opposes Russia’s
full hegemony in the region,73  giving the Georgian government some room for manoeuvre. But unless
the international community is strongly involved in Abkhazia, Moscow will easily get rid of the pro-
independence Abkhaz elite. It is important to remember in this regard that ethnic Abkhaz do not form
a majority in Abkhazia.74
The August 2008 events also vindicated the view that there had been no reason to believe that the parties
to the conflict would establish direct contacts. After 2004, Saakashvili’s government opted for a moderate
policy on Abkhazia and actually gave implicit support to Sergey Bagapsh’s candidacy in the presidential
elections and his eventual presidency. In contrast, Moscow engaged actively in Abkhazia’s internal political
processes and used all means at its disposal, including economic and other sanctions, to promote the pro-
Russian candidate, Hajimba. As a result, a Bagapsh-Hajimba duo came to power in Sukhumi.75
Saakashvili’s government also attempted to encourage defections from the separatist authorities of
South Ossetia by creating the so-called “Sanakoyev Group”, which included the former prime minister
of South Ossetia, Dimitry Sanakoyev, and the former interior minister of the breakaway province,
Jemal Karkusov. The Sanakoyev Group was supposed to win the hearts and minds of the local
Ossetian population. But Moscow used heavy-handed methods to remove all pro-Georgian officials
from the Tskhinvali administration (Oleg Alborov, former secretary of the security council, became the
target of a bomb attack; Jemal Karkusov and Alan Parastayev, former secretary of the security council,
were arrested.) Finally, just days before the August war, Abkhaz leaders – apparently under instruc-
tions from Moscow – spoiled the German foreign minister’s new initiative, which sought to
internationalise the conflict resolution process. Germany’s foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
visited Sukhumi in July and proposed to convene an international conference on the conflict in
Abkhazia in mid September.76
Against the background of these developments, President Saakashvili, emboldened by his relatively
easy success in solving the problem of Adjara, launched the so-called “humanitarian attack” on Tskhinvali
in summer 2004. But this effort failed and triggered the renewal of hostilities.77  The Georgian
72 At first de facto president of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity and the speaker of parliament Znaur Gasiyev called for unification
with North Ossetia. Later, however, Kokoity vowed that Tskhinvali would never give up its independence. Civil Georgia: Kokoity
Reverses Remarks on S.Ossetia Joining Russia, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19467&search=South%20Ossetia (accessed
September 12, 2008).
73 The Abkhaz leadership are in no mood to relinquish the region’s independence. They admit, however, that Abkhazia may
join the union of Russia and Belarus. “Abkhazia Does Not Have Any Plans of Associated Relationship with Russia, but Will
Request Admission to the Union State – Bagapsh”, http://www.abkhaziagov.org/ru/president/press/news/detail.php?ID=13131
(accessed September 12, 2008)
74 There are different data on the demographic and ethnic structure of Abkhazia. According to Abkhaz sources, in 2003 the
total population of Abkhazia – 215,000 residents – included three large ethnic groups: Abkhaz – 43.8%, Georgians – 21.3%,
and Armenians – 20.8%. http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html (accessed 12.September, 2009). Georgian sources
estimate Abkhazia’s population at 145,000 residents, only 37% of which are said to be ethnic Abkhaz. http://
www.abkhazia.gov.ge/geo/population.php (accessed 12.September, 2009).
75 In the 2004 presidential elections in Abkhazia Moscow openly supported Stanislav Hajinba, former KGB officer. Sergey
Bagapsh owed his election victory partly to the support of the Georgian voters of the Gali district Angered by the defeat of
its favourate candidate, Moscow imposed economic sanctions on Abkhazia. Finally, with Russian mediation, a dual power
regime was established in Abkhazia with Bagapsh and Hajinba holding the offices of president and vice-president respectively.
76 Civil Georgia: Abkhaz leader says German plan unacceptable, 18 July, 2008. http://www.civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=18812&search=Steinmaier%20in%20Gali (accessed 12.September, 2009).
77 After the Rose Resolution a Tbilisi-backed popular uprising started in the Adjarian autonomous republic in May 2004 and
the autocratic and pro-Russian leader of Adjara, Aslan Abashidze, was forced to flee to Moscow. Encouraged by the success,
the Georgian government began a large-scale distribution of humanitarian aid in the Tskhinvali region. But the separatist
government opposed this initiative and the conflict escalated into military confrontation.
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government’s new robust approach was unable to change the status quo in the region. But it alarmed
Russia (see above) and led to the more active involvement of Moscow in the conflict zones. In
addition, it re-ignited simmering anti-Georgian sentiments amongst the local population. The Georgian
government’s conflict resolution measures always went hand in hand with a war rhetoric. On the one
hand, it is clear that the authorities used this rhetoric as a tool to “melt” the “frozen” conflicts and
provoke a reaction from the international community. This approach failed, but it raised expectations
of Georgian citizens to unrealistic levels, as they came to believe that the conflicts could be solved
easily. Besides, this rhetoric did not sit easily with the president’s peace initiatives for both Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. The latest peace plan for Abkhazia was proposed by the Georgian government in
March 2008.78
As a result of the August 2008 war, the number of IDPs in Georgia has increased by tens of
thousands. Large territories were deserted by the Georgian population. In all likelihood, they will be
populated by Russian nationals in the future and the myth about the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia will finally come to an end. It is noteworthy that the native populations of both regions,
ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetians alike, are now facing a rather bleak future. With Russia strongly object-
ing to the presence of international missions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, chances are high
that the Abkhaz and Ossetian people will eventually be assimilated.
1.3.2 Influence of the war on Georgia’s domestic politics
Hardest hit by the August 2008 crisis was what Saakashvili’s government boasted of as its greatest
achievement – efficient governance and public confidence in state institutions. In November 2003 the
new Georgian government had launched a social modernisation project. Its main objective was to
build a liberal state and liberal society in Georgia. One of the main elements of the project was the
replacement of traditional state institutions by more efficient ones. A robust security system (army and
police) capable of maintaining law and order across the entire country was seen as the main indicator
of efficient government.
In 2004-2008, the Georgian population grew convinced that the country was already able to solve its
main problems: the central government reasserted its authority in Adjara in 2004 and in Kodori Gorge
(Upper Abkhazia) in 2006, and strengthened its rule in ethnic enclaves. The government’s rhetoric was
promoting the idea that Georgia was strong enough to rise to any challenge and even to repel such
a powerful neighbour as Russia.79  Since the August events, however, the Georgian government is
controlling a smaller part of Georgia than it did before the conflict, while tens of thousands of
Georgian residents were forced to flee their homes. For this reason people may again become nihilistic
about the Georgian state. It must be noted, at the same time, that on the territories not controlled by
Russia, state institutions – police, fire and ambulance services, communications, transport, etc – op-
erated without a hitch even in the most critical days.
Political opponents of the Georgian government are also responsible for the heightened expecta-
tions of Georgian citizens regarding conflict resolution. They urged the government to raise the
stakes and sometimes proposed even more radical solutions than the government did.80  Had the
Georgian government taken another, more moderate approach to conflict settlement, the political
power struggle would have intensified in the country. Radicalism and the desire to topple the
government and seize power as quickly as possible remain major distinctive features of the
Georgian opposition. But the government must take its share of the blame, since it failed to
78 Civil Georgia: Saakashvili outlines Tbilisi’s Abkhaz Initiatives, 28. March, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17473
(accessed 13. September, 2008).
79 “It’s not Shevardnadze’s Georgia any more” – Saakashvili used to say, meaning that Georgia was not a failed state.
80 After joining the opposition ranks former defence minister Irakli Okruashvili accused the president Saakashvili of the lack
of courage to authorise measures to retake South Ossetia. Civil Georgia: Okruashvili Breaks Silence by Lashing Out at
Saakashvili, 25 September, 2007, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15861&search=Okruashvili%20breaks (accessed 13.
September, 2008).
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ensure inclusive political processes in the country, excusing itself by claiming a need for rapid
reforms. The events of October-November 2007 created good preconditions for cooperation be-
tween the government and the opposition. Mikheil Saakashvili’s slim victory in the presidential
elections was also conducive to a more cooperative political process. Unfortunately, a zero-sum
political process recurred in Georgia during the parliamentary elections. The government called
upon the opposition forces to unite around national interests but did not give them a voice in
defining these interests.
Although a majority of the opposition parties backed the government during the war, radical
opposition leaders were conspicuous by their absence at the president’s wartime meetings with the
country’s politicians. Some political parties agreed on September 5 to sign a political charter
which provided for measures to ensure a constitutional political process and the creation of an
anti-crisis group.81  But part of the radical opposition refused to endorse the document, claiming
that it was designed to strengthen the government’s authority. Besides, they did not believe that
the anti-crisis group would have any influence on the decision-making process. The future activi-
ties of this group and its format will test the ability and readiness of the country’s political forces
for cooperation.
In the short term, a broad political consensus on the rules of the game will be a significant factor
both for Russia, lest it tries to destabilise Georgia again, and for western governments, which will use
this factor to decide how actively to foster democracy in Georgia and facilitate the European integra-
tion of the country.
1.3.3 Influence of the war on Georgia’s foreign policy
After the August 2008 events, the western world found itself in a strange predicament. On the one
hand, the West has pledged to take active part in the conflict resolution process; on the other hand,
opportunities for western involvement are limited, since both conflict zones remain under full Russian
control and, given the current rhetoric, Moscow will hardly agree to an international peacekeeping
operation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.82  So the prospects for the internationalisation of the conflict
settlement process seem as dim as ever.
The impact of the August 2008 crisis on the European and Euro-Atlantic integration prospects is not
immediately clear. On the one hand, it is obvious that the Russian aggression turned the Georgian
problem into an international security issue. Russia’s repeated statements that it will block Georgia’s
(and Ukraine’s) entry into NATO, whatever it costs,83  might motivate NATO member-states to stand
up to Moscow’s blackmail and support the integration process. Besides, against the backdrop of
political decisions, some questions need to be answered – How should the expansion go ahead before
the conflicts are settled? What measures are necessary to ensure a strong western presence in the
conflict zones?
The rapid deployment of EU observers in the buffer zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia is quite
a realistic short-term goal that the West can achieve in Georgia. It is feasible as long as Russia is
unlikely to pull out its troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the near future. In addition, it is
a vital precondition for getting the political and economic process in Georgia back to normal, rebuild-
ing its war-damaged infrastructure, and facilitating the country’s European integration.
81 Civil Georgia: Charter of Politicians of Georgia, 5 September, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/
article.php?id=19410&search=Anticrisis%20Charter (accessed 13. September, 2008).
82 Diplomat: Russia stalling over Georgia observers, 12 September, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/09/12/
russia.georgia.monitors.ap/index.html (accessed 13. September, 2008).
83 Dimitry Medvedev stressed that Russia would have attacked Georgia even if the county had been given MAP by that time.
Civil Georgia: Medvedev warns NATO over Georgia Membership, 12. September, 2008 (accessed 13 September, 2008).
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1.4 Recommendations
(1) Recommendations to the Georgian government
Recommendations with regard to the conflicts
• There is no alternative to the peaceful resolution of the current conflicts. Rapid reconstruction
and development, aiming to demonstrate the benefits of life in Georgia to the populations of
the breakaway republics, is the government’s main task.
• The likelihood of direct contacts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia is low, though Russia’s
assimilation policy may increase the chances of establishing direct relations with Abkhazia.
Recommendations with regard to domestic policy
• Invite all political and public groups to freely and openly discuss the conflict resolution
problems and other strategic issues of the country. From this viewpoint, Mikheil Saakashvili’s
approval of parliamentary debates on the August events is surely a positive development.
• Reform political institutions, launch state assistance programs for political parties, and improve
the election system. From this viewpoint, the government’s promise to start a new wave of
democratisation must surely be welcomed.
• Ensure an inclusive political process. The anti-crisis council must be authorised to make im-
portant decisions.
• Facilitate the development of public institutions, primarily of the media.
(2) Recommendations to the Georgian opposition
• Assume responsibility for constitutional stability.
• Engage in the development and implementation of a dialogue format.
(3) Recommendations to the Georgian NGO sector
• Engage in the development of a dialogue format and assume the role of a public debate forum.
• Generate and disseminate new ideas and become a reliable partner for the political elite.
• Facilitate the development of public institutions, especially of the media.
(4) Recommendations to international organisations
Recommendations with regard to former Soviet republics
• Unequivocally support Ukraine’s democratic government and openly specify what measures
will be taken against Russia in case of Russian aggression against Kiev.
• Begin a pragmatic policy towards the leadership of the Soviet successor states in order to
prevent their dependence on Moscow from increasing.
• Develop and publicise an EU action plan on energy security and define the region’s place in
the plan.
Recommendations with regard to the conflicts
• Prevent the validation of Russia’s unilateral recognition of two breakaway regions.
• Do not ease pressure on Russia to make it provide free access to the conflict zones for western
organisations.
• Protect local communities from the danger of assimilation by Russia.
• Take real steps to ensure step-by-step return of IDPs to the conflict zones.
• Prevent property of IDPs from being illegally privatised.
Recommendations with regard to Georgian domestic politics
• Promote political dialogue and urge the political elite to accept the cooperative model of
relating to opponents.
• Press for transparency in the government and adopt approaches with greater conditionality.
• Help the political opposition and NGOs to improve their skills and capacities.
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Georgia’s economic profile will change seriously in the wake of the August war. The war formed a
dramatic watershed for many sectors and branches of the economy.
Nothing is new today in Georgian-Russian economic relations. The current bilateral process started
seven years ago, when visa requirements were introduced in gross violation by Russia of the agree-
ment on unhindered movement of the citizens of the CIS countries, the only real benefit which that
loose alliance had for years. The pattern was reinforced stage by stage with the embargo on Georgian
citrus fruit, then on other agricultural produce, and later on wine, mineral water and Georgian juices.
In other words, restrictions on the free movement of individuals were followed by bans on the free
movement of goods, both of which were enforced successfully. Since late 2006, Russia has maintained
an all-out economic embargo, which is manifested in the artificial and forced severance of all types
of relations. The entirely deliberate fuss about the visas – their suspension then re-imposition, now
tighter and now dragged-out issuance – clearly testifies to this.
From early 2008, some softening of the visa requirements was noticeable, with comparatively orderly
visa issuance, and resumption of communication services (air and sea travel, postal communication,
possible reopening of the Larsi customs office). However, with the beginning of combat operations,
all this progress was dashed and became history.
The Georgian economy has more or less passed the survival test of the war, but it has also sustained
heavy damage. Direct losses apart – first and foremost among these, losses in human lives, which are
irrecoverable – huge funds will have to be spent to restore the ruined infrastructure. The occupying
forces still continue to destroy infrastructure and will probably keep doing so while Russian troops
remain in different areas of Georgian territory. Not only the military, but mostly the civilian and
economic infrastructure – roads, communications, industrial and manufacturing facilities – were at-
tacked by Russian tanks and fighter jets numerous times. In addition, as was expected, the Georgian
economy came under threat of not only direct military aggression, but also the immediate or long-term
consequences of the Russian aggression as soon as the combat operations began.
2.1 International credit ratings
Both leading international rating agencies, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s, reduced Georgia’s
sovereign credit ratings when the war started. Fitch decreased Georgia’s long term ratings for national
and foreign currency from BB- to B+84  and changed the rating change outlook from “stable” to
“negative.” Standard & Poor’s also downgraded Georgia’s long-term rating from B+ to B.85
It is noteworthy this was the second noticeable downgrade this year: In May, Standard & Poor’s had already
reduced its outlook from “positive” to “stable.” Already at that time, the following reason was cited: “The
84 “Georgia violence hurts Russian, emerging markets”, Reuters, Friday, Aug 8, 2008. The Fitch Ratings company rates
issuers by the grades of reliability which are designated in letters: The AAA rating is given to the most reliable companies
and countries, and D rating to those whose probability of solvency is below 50%. The reduction of Georgia’s credit from
BB- to B+ means that the country has considerable credit risks. Financial obligations are honored, although solvency depends
on the economic situation that has taken shape (see more detailed information at www.fitchratings.com).
85 “Georgia violence hurts Russian, emerging markets”, Reuters, Friday, Aug 8, 2008. Standard & Poor’s rates issuers by the
grades of reliability which are designated in letters: The AAA category is given to the most reliable companies or countries,
D– to those who have experienced defaults. The downgrade of Georgia’s rating from B+ to B means that the country is
considered solvent, but disadvantageous economic circumstances are likely to adversely affect its situation and ability to pay
off debts (see more detailed information at www.standardandpoors.com).
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outlook was reviewed because of irreversibility of deteriorating relations with Russia because of the growing
militarization of the separatist regions.” The company’s analysts also noted that the “decision by the Russian
authorities to increase their military presence in South Ossetia will cause escalation of the regional conflicts
and hinder Georgia’s accession to NATO. This is highly likely to affect Georgia’s tax and budget indicators
this year because the flow of funds to the growing Georgian economy is likely to decrease.” After the
beginning of combat operations, the following was cited as the reason for the rating company’s “negative”
outlook: “The fall of direct investments that will follow the escalation of tensions with the separatist regions
might result in a more significant slowdown of the economic growth than we expected.”
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also predicted slowing economic
growth in Georgia if combat operations continued.86  The US-based Global Insight think tank,87  which
consults Western companies on the risks of doing business in Georgia, increased Georgia’s indicator
in its security rating from 3.75 to 4 (5 being the maximum), and the risks of doing business from
3 to 3.5. In other words, after these changes doing business in Georgia is considered extremely risky.
It is clear that the Russian aggression aimed not only to annex territory, undermine the country’s
military potential and change the government, but also to weaken Georgia economically.
2.2 Budget revenue
For obvious reasons, uncertainty could not be avoided in the budgetary process. There were no
problems in this respect during the war and a few days afterwards. For example, the national budget
revenue on just the day of 13 August was 18 million GEL, whereas the average daily figure is 15-
16 million GEL. But during the period that followed, the fall of budget revenues became marked,
which the Georgian Government attributed to the restrictions on movement of cargo on the country’s
territory. More specifically, in the working week of 18-22 August, the average daily budget revenue
was 10.1 million GEL, which was 38% less than in the working week of 11-15 August and 29% less
than the average revenue during the January-July period.88
Accurate assessment of the damage is almost impossible at this stage because the central authorities’
jurisdiction over the areas which were under their control before 7 August has not been restored.
Accordingly, there are only indirect reports and approximate figures available on the damage to the
areas that are not under the government’s control. As for the already identified damage, it can be said
with certainty that effectively all sectors of the Georgian economy have sustained serious damage both
during the combat operations and after them.
2.3 Sectoral analyses
2.3.1 Banking
The banking sector has been the fastest-growing sector of the country’s economy, and economic
growth and the proper functioning of the other sectors hinge on the banking sector’s success. When
Fitch Ratings revised Georgia’s credit ratings, the ratings of the country’s leading commercial banks
(Bank of Georgia, TBC Bank, Procreditbank, VTB Bank Georgia) also decreased automatically by one
grade. In other words, their reliability is likely to diminish and borrowing from international markets
will become more expensive for them with resulting hikes in credit interest rates for their customers.
After its post-war return to normal operations, the banking sector continues to offer its services with
some clear changes. Almost all services, with rare exceptions, have become more difficult for the
customers. Even in late September, not all restrictions have been lifted, and clients continue to encounter
hindrances in their relations with banks. The service of consumer loans, which accounted for a consid-
86 “EBRD sees Georgia economic fallout from war”, Reuters, Monday, August 11, 2008.
87 “Conflict Escalates Dangerously as Russia Advances into Central Georgia”, Global Insight, Monday, August 11, 2008.
88 “The Georgian economy: Take Care of Business”, Press Release, Government of Georgia, Friday, August 22, 2008.
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erable share of the banks’ portfolios, was resumed with restrictions. This resulted in weaker sales in the
retail business. Compared to the prewar period, the number of customers at some of the retail networks
has halved. Experts say that at least 2-3 months will be required to reach pre-August sales levels.
The situation with mortgage loans is even worse. The market has effectively been paralyzed. Before,
apartments in newly built buildings were predominantly purchased using precisely this service; now
mortgage loans are completely inaccessible. In addition, the Financial Oversight Agency issued recom-
mendations to commercial banks to take into account the current situation and tighten controls over
loan issuance. This forces the banks to refrain from issuing credits, which significantly reduces the
amount of money in circulation.
The losses which the banks have already sustained are also obvious. During the combat operations,
customers withdrew 265 million USD in deposits from the two leading banks which controlled up to
60% of the sector (165 million USD from the Bank of Georgia, or 10% of the entire deposit account
assets, and 100 million USD from TBC Bank). In total, 300 million USD in deposits were withdrawn
from the banking sector, which very much reduced the amount of money available to the banks.89
Footballer Kakhi Kaladze’s Progressbank postponed its launch, which was scheduled for September.
Latvia’s Parexbank also postponed its entry into the Georgian market.90
The GEL/USD exchange rate has not changed in this period, fluctuating around the 1:1.41 mark. Major
changes are not expected in the future, but if they take place, the National Bank has sufficient resources
to maintain stability of the currency market, although stability is quite expensive: From 8 to 31 August,
Georgia’s currency reserves shrunk by about 25% from 1.47 billion USD to 1.12 billion USD.91
2.3.2 Construction
The war was a heavy blow to those sectors of the economy whose share in the country’s economic
growth was substantial. For example, the leading residential development companies did not sell a single
apartment in Tbilisi during the war. This was yet another problem for the construction sector, which was
already in crisis. There are confirmed reports that one of the two construction sector leaders, Axis, was
able to sell only 1 apartment in August, and Iberia did not sell any; buyers cancelled the remaining
contracts. The same Axis bore 2 million USD in damages because of the Russian military aggression.
The company lost 1.5 million USD in Tbilisi when development projects were suspended on account of
the military intervention. In addition, the company owned office space worth 700,000 GEL in the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, which the Russian invaders leveled with tanks.92
Because the channels of import were closed, there are problems with construction material supplies in
the country; because of this, 75% of construction projects are suspended in the country by September
2008. And the “freezing” of the construction projects created huge problems for both construction
companies that cannot honor their obligations (to their clients, shareholders and commercial banks) and
to countless other associated companies from different sectors (banks, haulers, service companies and so
on). The construction sector problems could have a domino effect on the wider economy.
2.3.3 Industry
Facilities whose proper functioning was pivotal to the Georgian economy in general were bombed
more than once during the Russian invasion. Russian bombs dropped on the Tbilisi Aviation Associa-
tion, which had accounted for about 10% of entire Georgian exports in previous years.93
89 “$300 million withdrawn from the commercial banks,” Akhali Komersanti, 8-15 September.
90 Georgian Banking Review, August 2008.
91 Georgian Banking Review, August 2008.
92 “Axis categorically denies real estate crisis,” Radio Komersanti, 9 September.
93 “Georgian foreign trade by groups of products”, Department of Statistics, 2006, 2007.
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The Kaspi cement factory, one of the most successful industrial facilities in German-based
HeidelbergCement’s ownership, which supplied its products both to domestic and foreign markets, was
also bombed.
The Russian military and North Caucasian mercenaries are still mercilessly looting and destroying
small and medium-sized businesses in Samegrelo and Shida Kartli, which formed the economic back-
bone of these regions. For example, the Lomisi brewery in Akhalgori, which is owned by the Turkish
giant Efes, has stopped production and been looted. It remains unclear whether these companies plan
to go to court and demand compensation for damages and lost property.
In the beverages sector, it emerged that foreign investors had lost interest in the Georgian market,
which will further aggravate the brewers’ situation and drive beer prices higher than expected. Beer
prices had already increased by 10-15 tetri (0.1-0.15 GEL) for a half-liter bottle over the summer. This
trend might persist in the future.
Efes has already officially informed Kazbegi that talks will be postponed by at least six months. The
future of the contract with Castel is also uncertain. The talks with the brewery were to be finalized
in the fall. It seems that the idea of founding an amalgamated holding company has been thwarted,
at least for now. The situation is no better at Lomisi, which brews two brands, Lomisi and Natakhtari.
Efes bought the company in February and paid 70 million USD for it.94  Assessment of the damage
to the Turkish-owned brewery in Akhalgori, which was looted during the Russian invasion, has not
taken place yet. The company management cannot say at this stage how they will try to get compen-
sated for the damages.
The expected longer-term damage to the industry merits separate discussion. According to preliminary
reports, the fires in the Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park will affect the quality of Borjomi mineral
water and other mineral waters and agrarian produce, which might eventually weaken their market
positions.
2.3.4 Agriculture
The Russian invasion inflicted considerable damage on the agricultural sector, both during the war and
in its aftermath. According to preliminary estimates, the grape harvest this year will yield 130,000
tons, which is 100,000 tons less than last year.95  Not only bad weather conditions, but also the
Russian invasion, which damaged a substantial share of vineyards in Kartli, account for this. In late
September, Parliament passed amendments to the national budget to allocate 27.5 million GEL in
subsidies for the grape harvest in Kakheti. Of this amount, 9 million will be made available to the
Ministry of Agriculture, and 18.5 million GEL will be issued in low-interest rate loans.96  The problem
is that implementing budget changes will probably take a week or two, which means that these funds
might not reach the addressees before the end of the harvest.
The Russian occupants hindered the launch of the apple harvest season in Georgia too. The season
is to start in a few days’ [mid September], but the key apple area near Gori is still under the
Russian aggressors’ control, and the Georgian side cannot even ascertain what harvest volumes are
to be expected. Georgian apples are exported to Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and these countries are
ready to buy produce this year, but while roads and railway lines remain blocked, apple exports will
encounter problems. Together with foreign partners, the Georgian authorities planned to build a
large cooled apple storage facility in Gori. Implementation of the project was postponed indefinitely
because of the war.
94 Turkey’s Efes buys Georgia’s top beer maker, Reuters, Friday, February 8, 2008.
95 Statement by Agriculture and Food Minister Bakur Kvezereli, Georgian Government meeting, 8 September 2008.
96 Civil Georgia: “MPs Discuss Budgetary Amendments”, 26 September, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19609
(accessed 27. September, 2008).
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Losses of incurred by farmers because they could not send their produce to the capital city and other
large towns when the roads were blocked are difficult to calculate.
2.3.5 Transport
The Georgian railroad suffered serious losses. The damage that was caused by the blowing up of the
railroad bridge near Kaspi was twofold: On the one hand, there are direct repair expenses, and on the
other hand, potential revenues from cargoes that could be delivered were not received. The economic
damage has not been calculated yet, and financial losses reach 30 million GEL. In addition, the
Georgian Railroads Company will have to compensate Azerbaijan for the price of the train of oil tanks
which was destroyed near the village of Skra. Repairs to the Metekhi-Grakali section of the railroad
cost 1 million USD.97
As for cargo shipments, service has resumed both to Azerbaijan and to Armenia, including from the
Georgian Black Sea ports. From 1st September, passenger services have been restored in all directions
too. However, losses from their suspension were also considerable and will be calculated in the near
future. Despite the current critical situation, the work on the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars trunk railroad project
has also been resumed after its suspension during the combat operations.
The Georgian air carriers also suffered great losses because of the closure of airspace by the Russians.
The Russian onslaught on the Georgian economy is continued by Russian government organizations
too. The Russian Air Navigation Service urged air carriers not to use Georgian airspace because of
its presumed dangers, and to resort to alternative routes. The international air routes that traverse
Georgia are used by 100-200 airlines a day and transit flights continue as usual.
The motor trucking sector also suffered damages. The blocking of the country’s main motorway and the
cutting off of the traffic between the east and west of the country completely paralyzed haulers for
several weeks. In addition to domestic trucking, the pattern of transit trucking also changed significantly
because the international haulers either suspended operations or found routes alternative to Georgia.
Maritime and ferry transport was paralyzed altogether. Because of the blockade of the seaport of Poti,
shipping was either suspended (ferry lines, for example), or operated with great difficulties. The same
applies to the seaports of Batumi and Kulevi, whose operations were severely downsized because of
the reduced transit of oil.
2.3.6 Tourism
The tourism sector was one of the first victims of the August events. Representatives of this sector
are not optimistic about the future any more because it will be increasingly difficult to attract foreign
tourists with promises of a peaceful, quiet and unpolluted environment.
Tourism was one of the leaders of the Georgian economy in terms of attracted investments. The
Adjarian Tourism Department reported that some 34,000 tourists were in Adjara – a region which was
not affected by war – before the launch of combat operations. The majority of tourists left Adjara as
soon as the combat operations started.98
Assessment of the damage from the disrupted holiday season is currently under way. The war affected
the number of visiting tourists. As of 31 July, 136,975 tourists visited Adjara this year, which was
38% more than in the corresponding period of 2007. But as of 31 August, the number of visitors was
182,531, which was 28.6% less than in 2007.99  Top officials for the Revenues Service’s Adjarian
97 News briefing by Georgian Railroads General Director Irakli Ezugbaia, 28 August 2008.
98 Adjarian Tourism Department’s monthly report, August 2008.
99 Adjarian Tourism Department’s monthly report, August 2008
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regional branch said that the losses to the budget from tourism will not exceed 6 million GEL.100
However, losses of households are very high, especially given that the majority built or purchased
tourist facilities (hotels, private houses, restaurants, cafes and so on) with bank loans because they
counted on much larger numbers of tourists.
Tourists did not go to the seaside or the mountains even after the end of combat operations. Some
are afraid to travel in the area, while others are deterred by the pollution of the sea with oil products
and gorges that were damaged by fires.
The companies that organize tours to Georgia took a serious financial blow. Compared to last year,
the number of foreign tourists increased dramatically in July. The majority of their customers wanted
to visit Georgia in the second half of August. Among them were residents of Israel, Ukraine and the
Baltic states. Many of them had already paid for their holidays and had to be refunded.
The fall is usually the season of wine tours to Kakheti. Despite the stabilization of the situation and
the fact that Kakheti was effectively unscathed by war, foreigners still refrain from visiting Georgia.
At present, hotels and tourist companies report virtually non-existent foreign tourism to Georgia.
2.3.7 Infrastructure
The main economic gateway of the country, the seaport of Poti (which is now owned by the UAE-
based Rakeen Investment), was bombed many times and still has not resumed its operations in full
and requires major investments for rehabilitation work. Due to decreased or hindered cargo turnover,
the seaport of Poti has suffered serious losses. (Its military sections sustained substantial damage.) The
decrease in cargo transit caused the seaport 2 million USD in losses during the very first few days
of the war.101
The seaport of Poti has calculated damages from bombing. Only part of the seaport’s infrastructure
is operational today because some of the components of its infrastructure were damaged. Bombing
damaged 279,000 USD in equipment and property. Shareholders of the seaport suffered 100,000 USD
in losses. The seaport of Poti plans to sue Russia at an international court, with a detailed breakdown
of damages.
The Turkish-Georgian oil company Channel Energy’s lost 1.1 million USD due to a cluster bomb that
damaged its oil tanks in Poti port.
The road infrastructure was also greatly damaged. Intense traffic of Russian combat vehicles on the
roads damaged the tarmac – on many sections, it had been repaired shortly before the war – and put
the issue of repaving the roads on the agenda.
2.3.8 Energy
The Czech company Energo Pro, owner of the regional electricity distribution networks, voiced its
protests against the Russians’ unconstrained behavior. The occupiers, who are scattered over the west
of Georgia, have already arranged comfortable living standards for themselves and are stealing elec-
tricity. Energo Pro has already cut off illegal connections in Zugdidi, Tsalenjikha and Khobi several
times, but the Russians continue to steal electricity and threaten Energo Pro staff with reprisals if they
cut wires. As a result, the Russian invasion caused Energo Pro 6 million GEL in losses.102  This
100 Official report by the Revenues Service Adjarian regional branch, September 2008.
101 Statement by Hater Masaat, chairman of the board of Rakeen Georgia, owner company of the seaport of Poti, Interpressnews
agency, 10 September 2008.
102 Statement by Libor Olehla, head of Energo Pro Georgia’s internal audit department, Interpressnews agency, 10 September
2008.
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includes damage to the power relay lines and switching stations which Energo Pro currently cannot
control in the Akhalgori District and in Georgian villages in the Tskhinvali region.
2.3.9 Trade
Cargo turnover and trade operations both decreased dramatically because of the blockade of the
seaport of Poti and of motorways during the combat operations, damage to the railroad infrastructure
and diminished air traffic, and temporary restrictions in the banking and other sectors. The trend
toward diminishing budget revenues testifies to this. Many importers had problems with dispatching
cargoes from the Georgian borders to Tbilisi and the east of Georgia during that period.
Many types of import cargoes could not enter the country at all. Even by mid September, most of
these cargoes couldn’t be imported into the country. First and foremost, this affected the import of
cars, which were the second largest item of import. Neither official dealers nor individual importers
can import them in sufficient numbers and in a timely fashion.
Exporters also encountered a variety of problems. The main maritime route of exports, which ran via
the seaport of Poti, was paralyzed, and forwarding export products via alternative routes was very
difficult because it would substantially increase both shipping time and costs. In addition, the risks
were seen as high.
The problems in Georgia’s banking sector (see above) will have a significant negative impact on the
trade sector. The overall investment environment has worsened, and therefore it is likely that the
inflow of capital will slow down till the end of the year. In addition, the growth rate of loans will
slow down due to the higher risks. Loans issued by the commercial banks to the national economy
increased by 2 billion USD (56.9%) compared to the corresponding period last year and exceeds 5.4
billion USD.103  Of this money, the largest share of credits was issued to legal entities, 47% went to
the trade sector. By comparison, in one year the amount of loans to the trade sector increased by
37.5% and reached 1.5 billion GEL.104  Tighter lending requirements will certainly have a negative
effect on these indicators.
2.4. Recommendations
The economic impact is not fully clear yet, especially as Russian troops still remain on Georgian
territory and hinder the functioning of the country’s economy as much as they can. This year, the
forecast for economic growth fell from 9.3% to as low as 5-6%.105  Last year the amount of foreign
direct investment in Georgia was 2 billion USD; the government expects that figure to fall to 1.7
billion USD this year in the best-case scenario.106  (Even 1.7 billion USD in foreign investments is
unlikely.) This constitutes a very heavy blow to the Georgian economy.
According to preliminary estimates, the amount of damage to the Georgian economy is between
one and two billion USD. According to Senator Richard Lugar’s office’s estimates, restoring the
Georgian economy and getting it back to normal will require 3-4 billion USD. In addition, unless
aid is provided on time, Georgian GDP growth stands to fall by 10% instead of growing by the
same margin.107
103 The commercial banks issued more than $5.4 billion of loans to the national economy, press release by the Georgian
National Bank on 4 August 2008.
104 The commercial banks issued more than $5.4 billion of loans to the national economy, press release by the Georgian
National Bank on 4 August 2008.
105 Statement by Economic Development Minister Ekaterine Sharashidze at the Georgian Government meeting, 3 September
2008.
106 Statement by Prime Minister Vladimer Gurgenidze at the Georgian Government meeting, 3 September 2008.
107 “Lugar Oversees Relief to Georgia”, Press Release of Senator Lugar, August 25, 2008.
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It is a fact that the country’s economy more or less survived the shock of war. What is important now
is getting it back to normal with minimum losses. A whole range of emergency anti-crisis steps have
to be taken. Not all the measures necessary fall comfortably in line with the principles of a pure
market economy, but they still need to be taken in this extraordinary economic situation
General recommendations:
• Urgently establish coordination among all the groups involved in the calculation of damage,
tally up their results, determine the real picture, and identify and diagnose the especially
vulnerable areas that require immediate attention and take appropriate measures.
• Distribute the already mobilized and expected aid among the various sectors of the economy,
avoiding both excessive dispersion of aid and its overlap. There is also a need to identify the
areas and responsibilities that will receive aid from the country’s central budget, and those that
will be aided by donors.
• Restructure the tax and other budgetary liabilities which accumulated during the war in a
manner that will not damage the national interests or augment risks of business bankruptcies.
• Encourage startup businesses by eliminating administrative barriers, shortening procedures and
reducing the transaction costs.
• Introduce favorable conditions for foreign investors and those who create new jobs (tax holi-
days, extended grace periods, simplified procedures of starting a business and so on).
Sector-specific recommendations:
• Partial revision of banking regulations and simplification of access for the commercial banks
to the National Bank’s monetary reserves to address the problem of liquidity in the banking
sector. At the same time, oversight in the banking sector should become more consistent and
strict to avoid commercial banks slipping into a problematic phase.
• Terms of repayment and settlement of loans (both from commercial banks and “cheap loans”)
should be revised, especially in the conflict zone and adjacent areas, to avoid leaving busi-
nesses and individual borrowers moneyless on the one hand while preventing damage to the
state-owned and commercial banks on the other.
• Avoid the collapse of the construction sector, local construction companies should be involved
as much as possible in rehabilitation work; this will give them additional contracts.
• Make government procurements for rehabilitation work in the affected regions as transparent
as possible. Bidders should be instructed to employ local businesses and labor, including IDPs,
during the rehabilitation process.
• Support both agribusinesses and private farmers; allocate funds to ensure continued functioning
of the economic cycle and to avoid the spread of poverty.
• There is a need to support the return of industrial sector products to their old markets, and
their entry into new markets.
• There is a need for further modernization of the energy sector, promotion of alternative sources
of energy and greater diversification of the energy sector. Russian energy resources may well
become more expensive, or be cut off altogether; Georgia needs to prepare for this.
• There is a need to rebuild tourism. There is a need to develop tours that will attract foreign
tourists, and to make the tours more diverse.
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In addition to attacking and destroying military and civilian infrastructure, the Russian military aggres-
sion in August 2008 caused an ecological disaster in Georgia. According to Georgian official sources,
as well as various international information sources, eyewitness reports and experts judgments, the
Russian military attacks caused substantial damage to the natural ecosystems of the Caucasus and
Black Sea regions.
The Caucasus is among the planet’s 34 biodiversity hotspots, and one of the few hotspots that lie in
an area with a non-tropical climate. There are many endemic and relict species of plants and animals.
20 to 30% of flowering plants, mammals, amphibians, reptiles, fish, and a high proportion of inver-
tebrates living in the Caucasus are not found outside the region. The impact of the conflict on the
environment cannot simply be captured by simple calculation of hectares of forest burnt, or of the
level of pollution of rivers and the Black Sea.
Although being far from the conflict zones, three protected areas of Georgia are affected by military
operations. These protected areas are:
• mountain forests of Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park (IUCN category 2)
• terrestrial and marine parts of Kolkheti National Park (IUCN category 2) on the Black Sea
• riparian forests of Liakhvi Nature Reserve (IUCN category 1)
Particularly high damage was observed in the forests of the Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park and
adjacent areas.
The first section of this report contains a list of environmental damages caused by the Russian
aggression, compiled on the basis of official information. The second section is dedicated to a com-
prehensive analysis of short and long term environmental damage. Hereby the impact on a regional,
national and global level is summarized in the form of a matrix. The third section discusses the legal
aspects of the Russian aggression, and of the environmental damages caused by this aggression. The
forth and last section provides recommendations for future action.
3.1 Timeline of environmental damages
3.1.1 Forest fires
According to information provided by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, hundreds of hectares of unique forest in various regions
of Georgia have been purposefully destroyed by the Russian military forces during the second
half of August.
Borjomi Gorge (Samtskhe-Javakheti Region): Fires were started in the forests of the Borjomi gorge
at about 3:30 PM on August 15, 2008. According to eyewitness reports, the fires started in the
Borjomi-Tsemi forests after Russian military helicopters dropped incendiary bombs. During the follow-
ing days, including August 18, some new forests fire locations were recorded. According to eyewit-
nesses’ reports, the start of these fires coincided with the appearance of Russian helicopters.
By September 7, when the fires were officially declared extinguished, the area of burned forests
amounted to over 950 ha.  Visual observation confirms that 250 ha of forest have been totally
destroyed (150,000 m³ of wood). Over a further 700 ha area, 70% of trees have been destroyed
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(150,000 m³ of wood). As a result of the fire, the vegetation cover has lost its ecological function
and commercial value.
Ateni Gorge (Shida Kartli Region): On August 20, fires were recorded in the forests of the Ateni
gorge. The main fire was located on August 24. About 50 ha of forests have burned down.
Other areas: According to eyewitness reports, on August 16 as a result of Russian aerial bombard-
ments, fires started in forests in:
• the Kaspi area in Shida Kartli region (10:30 AM)
• village Surami in Khashuri district, Shida Kartli region (4:30 PM)
• Kharagauli in Imereti region
• Kojori in Kvemo Kartli region
On August 22, forests near the village of Khaishi in Mestia district (Upper Svaneti) started burning.
According to the local population, the fire started at night as a result of flares shot by drunk Russian
soldiers. Forests covering an area of 3 ha burnt down.
The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Georgia called upon the embassies of China,
Germany, Italy, France, the USA, Switzerland, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Armenia, the
Netherlands as well as the EC delegation in Georgia for help.
Official letters were sent to several international organizations: OSCE, UNDO, the World Bank, NATO,
UN, Interpol, European Council, GTZ, KFW, OESD, UNOSAT, as well as to secretariats of conven-
tions on biodiversity, climate change, desertification, protection of the Black Sea, and of the five
UNECE conventions.
3.1.2 Oil spills in the Black Sea
The Russian army occupied the Poti coastal base on August 12. On August 13-14, the Russian
occupational forces blasted and sank 12 vessels of the Department of Coastal Protection of
Georgia and of the naval forces of the Ministry of Defence of Georgia. As a result, according
to preliminary information, about 50 tons of fuel oil as well as engine and hydraulic oils have
spilled into the sea.
Bombs and ammunitions which were stored within these vessels were also blown up, releasing an
unknown mix of chemicals into the sea.
By mid September the major part the oil slicks were still within the area of Poti port. The rest has
moved out to the open sea.
On August 22, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Georgia officially addressed the
Secretariat of the Convention on Protection of the Black Sea, requesting the expulsion of the Russian
Federation from the Convention.
3.1.3 Air and soil pollution from oil
On August 24 at 10:15 AM a train loaded with unrefined oil was blown up on the track between Gori
and Khashuri (Shida Kartli region). The explosion of the train was caused by the blasting of the Skra
military base of the Georgian Army by Russian military forces. The train was blown up by the
fragment of a missile shot from a distance of 300m. The blast wave caused the explosion of 11 more
wagons. In total 12 wagons with 60 tons of oil each exploded and burnt out. About 650 tons of oil
was burned and some of the oil was spilled. 21 carriages were moved to a safe area.
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4,000 m2 have been polluted; half of this area is 100% polluted. Presumably most polluted is the 220
m long and 20 m wide area along the railroad. The Department for Emergency Situations is imple-
menting site cleaning activities. Pits for collecting raw oil have been already dug and 70 tons of oil
have been removed.
The accident site is located at a distance of about 2 km from the village Skra and about 1300 metres
from the Mtkvari river. There are no underground water outlets, neither at the accident site nor in
adjacent areas. The nearest water intake point is located 650 – 700 m away from the accident site.
3.2 Preliminary assessment and evaluation
3.2.1 Possible impacts on natural environment
3.2.1.1 Impact on biodiversity and protected areas
Within the Caucasus eco-region, Borjomi area is one amongst a few key areas of biodiversity. The
Borjomi region is a part of the priority conservation area known as Trialeti (Trialeti Mountain Range),
which was identified by more than 150 experts from all countries of the eco-region as summarized in
the Ecoregional Conservation Plan (ECP)108 . The area is also identified as priority area for conservation
by the Conservation International Caucasus Programme of the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund
(CEPF). It covers part of two conservation areas, Borjomi-Kharagauli NP and Nedzvi sanctuary.109
The Borjomi area is noted for a high diversity of plants, insects, amphibians, reptiles and small
mammals, many of which are endemic species. The area is located on the biological crossroads of
different bio-geographic regions (Colchic, Minor Asian, South Caucasian-Iranian, and Caucasian itself/
East Caucasian). The area holds populations of species that, according to recent genetic studies, are
Tertiary relicts that have survived there for ten million or more years. Accordingly, this area represents
the main backbone of the protected areas network in the Caucasus.
All these factors are even more important in the light of the fact that the Borjomi-Kharagauli NP
is the very first National Park in the Caucasus, which was established in 1999-2002 according to
international criteria. The protection regime in the core zone of the national park has existed for
more than hundred years. The Trialeti Priority Conservation Area includes pristine forests, sub-
alpine meadows and provides a habitat for many endemic, rare and relict species. Borjomi-Kharagauli
NP is considered a model park for the Caucasus eco-region; two years ago, it became a member
of the PAN parks network.110
Approximately 1,000 ha of coniferous and mixed forests have been burnt at the western slopes of the
Trialeti Ridge (Borjomi Gorge, including parts of the Borjomi-Kharagauli Protected Areas). Over 50
ha of mixed forests have been burnt in the central part of Trialeti Range (river Tana valley) and in
locations throughout the rest of Trialeti range and the Borjomi-Kharagauli National Park. Due to the
forest fires, the biodiversity of this Priority Conservation Area has been seriously damaged. Adjacent
settlements and tourist resorts may be affected by this. (see map 1).
The indirect influence should definitely include much larger territory, which calls for separate evaluation.
The Borjomi-Kharagauli protected areas (Strict Nature Reserve and National Park, and Nedzvi Sanc-
tuary) have been affected by fires at Zoreti, Kvabiskhevi and Likani, as shown in map 2.
108 An Ecoregional Conservation Plan for the Caucasus, WWF, KfW, BMZ, CEPF, MacArthur Foundation, Printed by
Contour Ltd., Tbilisi, May 2006, 220 p.; see also at http://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/pdf_neu/
Kaukasus_OEkoregionaler__Naturschutzplan__May06.pdf
109 See at http://www.cepf.net/ImageCache/cepf/content/pdfs/caucasus_5foutcomemap_2epdf/v1/caucasus_5foutcomemap.pdf
110 See http://www.visitpanparks.org/ourparks/Borjomi-Kharagauli
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Regarding forest diversity, the largest conifer forests (fir, spruce, pine with mixture of oriental beech
and some other species) within the Lesser Caucasus are concentrated in this region (Priority Conser-
vation Area). So are the world’s largest stands of Oriental white spruce (Picea orientalis – Caucasian
endemic). The area is also distinguished by the existence of pristine forest stands, which is very rare
for a temperate zone and adds to the biological and conservation value of these forests.
The area which directly suffered from fire (Tsagveri-Daba sector) is identified as a High Conservation
Value area since it is characterized by the following features:
1. biodiversity of global, regional or national importance (endemism, endangered species)
2. important drinking water protection and soil erosion control area
3. main life-supporting resource for the local population (e.g. fuel wood)
4. essential economic asset of the local population (tourism)111
Furthermore, this area serves as a buffer zone for Nedzvi Sanctuary, which is part of the Borjomi-
Kharagauli Protected Areas.
Smoke, high temperatures, flames as well as the noise generated by fire fighting disturbed the habitats
and activities of the local fauna. They were stressed and may have migrated, with possible impact on
the spatial distribution of animals, conceivably entailing a reduction of habitats and a decrease in
reproduction.
According to preliminary data, the Russian aerial attacks have seriously damaged the Liakhvi reserve
(IUCN Category 1) located within the conflict zone controlled by the Russian army. Georgian and
international experts are not allowed to assess the situation on the spot.
3.2.1.2 Air pollution
According to preliminary information, a train loaded with 20 tanks of raw oil was blown up. As a
result, 12 tanks of oil were burned.
Below a list of the pollutants released by the fire.112
111 Further to criteria of High Conservation Value see at http://www.hcvnetwork.org/
112 Avtandil Budagashvili, Ambient air quality specialist, scientific-consulting company Gama.
113 Georgian Legal Bulletin ¹ 94 14.07.2006. Order ¹ 538 of the Minister of Environment Protection and Natural resources
of Georgia on Approval of Calculation Methods of Environmental Damage of July 5, 2006
Hazardous substance specific coefficient of emission (t/t) Total emission (t)  
carbon oxide  8.4 x 10-2 42.70 
hydrogen sulphide 1.0 x 10-3 0.510 
nitric oxides 6.9 x 10-3 3.505 
sulphur oxides 1.0 x 10-3 0.510 
soot  1.7 x 10-1 86.40 
hydrogen oxide cyanide  1.0 x 10-3 0.510 
vanadium oxides  4.64 x 10-4 0.235 
benzpyrene 7.60 x 10-8 0.00004 
Total compensation for the damage caused by the emissions is estimated at 45,628 GEL in accordance
with current legislation and relevant regulations.113
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3.2.1.3 Water pollution
The occupational forces did not permit national environmental organizations to assess the situation on-
site and determine the quantity of oil spilled into the sea. According to experts, some 50-70 tons of
oil were spilled into the Black Sea. The spilling of such a large quantity of oil is unprecedented in
Georgia’s coastal zone.
The port authorities and other institutions were not allowed by the Russian military forces to employ
skimmer and containment booms, which made it impossible to respond adequately to the spill and
hindered damage limitation.
The spilled oil and oil products heavily polluted the coastal zone of the Black Sea and threatened the
marine part of the Kolkheti National Park and its fish (e.g., sturgeon, grey mullet and herring). The
oil spill will negatively affect sea fauna, including large mammals. Oils are lightweight liquids; they
form a thin film on the water surface thus hampering the penetration of oxygen into the water. This
causes the death of water plants as well as animals.
The Black Sea current moved the spilled oil to the north of the city of Poti, into the direction of the
Kolkheti National Park and its protected sea zone. The Kolkheti National Park, located 5 km north
from the oil spill site, is distinguished by its unique biodiversity and is a part of the internationally
recognized Ramsar protected sites.
Oil spilled in these areas may cause a catastrophe and the death of many rare and threatened (included
in the Red List of Georgia) plants and animals. Moreover, pollution of soil and water with oil will
affect the internationally important peatlands of the Kolkheti lowland.
There is a hydraulic link between ground water and sea water in coastal zones. Specifically, ground
waters discharge into the sea shelf zone. The discharge is more intensive during low tide. During high
tides, there is less discharge, and the growth of salinity in wells located within the coastal zone is
observed. Oil is characterized by high mobility; during high tides oils can easily penetrate into ground
water circulating and pollute it. Pollution of the ground water used for drinking and other purposes
by the population of settlements located near Poti coast by hydrocarbons is unavoidable.
3.2.1.4 Climate change
In 1990s, about 40% of the territory of Georgia was occupied by forests. Probably, these figures have
decreased due to the energy crisis and the intensification of timber exports over the last 15 years;
however, official statistics do not confirm this.
The environmental damage caused by forest fires includes the emission of greenhouse gases (CO2,
CH
4
) into the atmosphere and the reduction of the CO
2 
absorption capacity of Georgia’s forests.
Furthermore, as a result of forest destruction, the regime of underground water recovery will probably
deteriorate. This will have a serious impact on the wate resources of the Borjomi region.
The available data suggests that greenhouse gases equivalent to 407,000 tons of carbon dioxide have
been emitted into the atmosphere as a result of forest fires in the Borjomi region. Considering the
current average market price of EUR 15 for the reduction of one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent,
the loss is estimated at EUR 6,105,000.
The burned forest was able to absorb 70,000 tons of carbon dioxide on average during 30 years.
It means that its carbon market price will be EUR 1,050,000. If not taking into account the
recreational, biodiversity, timber and fuelwood values of the forest, and considering it only from
the climate change convention point of view, the damage will amount to at least EUR 7.2 million
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over 30 years. Furthermore, the cost of reforestation for 1 ha of forest in the area is about EUR
10,000, adding EUR 7,500,000 in damages. Thus, the total damage is not less than EUR 14,7
million.
3.2.1.5 Soil damage
The forest fires in the Borjomi gorge have completely destroyed the forests, undergrowth and
topsoil. The fertile humus layer has been completely burned. Micro-biological processes required for
maintaining soil functions have been stopped, and soil fertility has been destroyed. Plant regenera-
tion will take a long time. Forest cover has a direct impact on hydrogeological and soil conditions,
and on geodynamic processes. Areas poor in vegetation cover are prone landslides, especially in
mountainous areas.
In such conditions, the balance between surface flows generated by precipitation and water infiltra-
tion into the sub-soil is disrupted in favour of surface flows. Increased volumes of surface waters
lead to the development of line erosion, gullying and landslide processes which ultimately will
result in floods, mudflows and avalanches, especially as all small rivers and ravines flowing on the
north slope of the Trialeti range have mudflow characteristics. More than 40 landslide areas are
recorded on the territory. The geological structure of the territory will further complicate the process
of soil regeneration, especially as this process takes centuries even in optimal conditions. The
regulation of underground waters has deteriorated, which might be result in the loss of fresh water
vitally important to the population. Restoration of the destroyed forests to their initial state may
take tens or hundreds of years.
3.2.2 Socio-economic impacts
Along with the environmental damage, the social and economic losses experienced by the population
of the affected zone, as well as of the whole country, caused as a result of the destruction of the
environment shall be taken into account.
3.2.2.1 Tourism
The key economic sustenance of the Borjomi region was tourism. The share of tourism in the budget
receipts of Svaneti and Poti (the Kolkheti National Park) regions had also been gradually increasing.
Two types of impacts can be distinguished in damage caused to tourist potential:
• Direct impact on the tourist potential factors of biodiversity, balneal-climatic conditions, and
aesthetic value. The major part of the tourist region of Georgia has fallen within the conflict
zone (Svaneti, the Kolkheti National Park).
• Stigma of military operations and fear of military operations. The influence of this factor is
much more significant and goes beyond the specific geographical boundaries of aggression and
is apparent throughout the country.
The Borjomi Gorge: According to information provided by the Borjomi municipality, the preliminary
assessment of damage caused by the Russian aggression is as follows:
• losses of the Borjomi municipality in the field of tourism: 9,060,600 GEL 
• industry: 20,670,000 GEL
Forest fires in the Borjomi gorge directly affected Borjomi city and the neighbouring villages.
90% of the households of these settlements were mainly dependent on tourism. A study of the
tourist potential of the region carried out by CENN in July 2008 showed that tourism was an
important source of income of the local population. Along with large hotels and family hotels,
renting of rooms to tourists was a common practice in this area. According to rough calcula-
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tions, the annual income of a family from the tourism business was 2,500 – 3,000 GEL. At the
same time, local investments in tourism were growing, thus contributing to tourist service
development.
Rapid development of the tourism sector and growth in the number of visitors was contributing to
development of a service infrastructure such as shops and transportation which were important sources
of income for the local population (the creation of one job in a main sector implies creation of four
additional jobs in the service sector). In this case, a comprehensive estimation of the damage is not
an easy task and requires special study.
Svaneti: The main communications connecting Svaneti with the rest of the country have been con-
trolled by the occupational forces, undermining tourism development.
The Kolkheti National Park: The territories adjacent to the Kolkheti National Park have fallen within
the so-called buffer zone as well. Occupational forces were engaged in the construction of fortifica-
tions. Therefore, there were no tourist flows.
Presumably the number of tourists in the future decreased significantly. A certain stigma – the Borjomi
gorge, Svaneti, the Kolkheti National Park and the whole Georgia being seen as a zone of military
operations – will play a key role. This stable and long-term factor will cause a decreased number of
tourists throughout the country.
In the short term (2-3 years), the fear caused by military operations will likely affect Georgian tourists
as well, especially those visiting the Borjomi gorge. The conflict coincided with the height of the
tourist season when the Borjomi gorge was hosting many families with little children. The main motor
road connecting the western and eastern parts of Georgia was blocked by the occupational forces,
fomenting fear. Many people were forced to use bypasses and village roads.
3.2.2.2 Fuel wood
The majority of the population living in the regions where the purposeful attacks of the Russian forces
caused major damaged to the forests used fuel wood for heating. The damage caused to the forests
considerably reduced fuel wood reserves in the long term. This in turn will cause considerable growth
of prices for fuel wood. Reduction of fuel wood reserves and growth of prices will have a negative
impact on the economic state of the population, especially of those living in the Borjomi gorge.
3.2.2.3 Migration
Migration from the Borjomi gorge and Svaneti is expected to accelerate. In the case of Svaneti, this
process may be aggravated by the current situation in which all communications with the region are
being controlled by the occupational forces. Consequently, the contacts with other regions of the
country will be complicated, which in turn will result in the socio-economic decline of the region and
contribute to the growth of migration flows.
The situation is grave in the Borjomi gorge too, as tourism there has also been damaged consid-
erably. The Borjomi gorge is not favourable for agricultural development. Tourism was the main
source of income for the locals. The decline of tourism is compounded by increased prices on fuel
and the decline of the tourism-related service sector. Presumably, the occurrence of natural disasters
and the damage caused by them (erosion, landslides and mudflows) will increase forest destruction.
All this will force the local population to leave the region and migrate in search of alternative
sources of income.
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3.3 Legal analysis
By employing methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, the Russian Federation violated
the international obligations it has undertaken. Russia is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the two 1977 Additional Protocols of these conventions. Paragraph 18 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions (ratified by Russia on 10-05-1954) stipulates the following:
All armed forces, whether regular or irregular, should continue to observe the principles and
rules of international environmental and humanitarian law to which the parties to the conflict
are bound in times of peace. Natural and cultural resources shall not be pillaged under any
circumstances.
In Additional Protocol I (ratified by Russia on 29-09-1989), Article 35 – Basic Rules – states:
It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
Additional Protocol I, Article 55 – Protection of the Natural Environment – states:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means
of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited
With specific relevance to the Borjomi operation, Russia is also a party to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, Protocol III, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Weapons (Geneva, 1980) which states (among other things):
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary
weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combat-
ants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives.
As well, the Statute of the International Criminal Court, established by the 1998 Rome Statute, which
entered into force on July 1, 2002, stipulates in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) that the following act may con-
stitute a war crime:
Scheme: Scales of impacts
Summary of environmental and socio-economic impacts
Key: ++ = Significant Issue + = Moderate Issue – = Insignificant or not applicable
Issue / Level Biodiversity Soil Natural 
disasters 
Air 
quality 
Socio-
economical 
Black Sea Climate 
Change 
Local ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ 
Regional ++ + + - ++ + + 
Global ++ - - - - + + 
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Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such an attack will cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
And although Russia is not an official party to it, the Rome Statute and International Criminal Court
is presumed to represent customary international law and to be respected as binding by all states.
Under Article 8, individuals, including heads of state, can be held criminally accountable if an attack
is intentional; inflicts widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage; and the attacker knew
the damage would be excessive. This applies to individuals that commit, order, or aid in the commis-
sion of such attacks.
Other rules of customary international law that prohibit damage to the environment in warfare and
are binding on all states (Bronkhorst and Koppe, 2007), include:
Firstly, a duty of care or an obligation to show due regard for the environment during
international armed conflict; secondly, a prohibition to cause wanton destruction to the envi-
ronment during international armed conflict; and thirdly, a prohibition to cause excessive
collateral damage to the environment during international armed conflict.
Even in self-defence, states are prohibited from engaging in military operations that are either unnec-
essary or disproportionate.
Thus, if the reports of the use of incendiary devices by the Russian military in the Borjomi region
are accurate, then it is likely that Russia has violated the above provisions of international law. Such
malicious behaviour – intentionally inflicting significant and unnecessary environmental harm as a
weapon of war – has no place in modern warfare, and cannot stand uncontested by the international
community.
The consequences for an international wrongful act as stipulated in the Draft Articles on the Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission
November 2001 (discussed in Bronkhorst and Koppe, 2007) include:
the obligation to offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, the obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act, either by means of res-
titution, i.e. to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed,
or by means of compensation insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Georgia, and national and international environmental organizations call upon the international com-
munity to resolutely condemn Russian actions on Georgian soil and re-examine the Russian Federation’s
relationship with international environmental treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), the Convention on Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, the Ramsar Convention,
CITES and others.
3.4 Recommendations
Based on the abovementioned analysis, the following measures are recommended:
• Implementation of a comprehensive environmental and socio-economic damage evaluation and
a study of rehabilitation measures.
• Implementation of activities for disaster risk reduction as well as rehabilitation of the environ-
ment according to the recommendations of the evaluation study.
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• Elaboration of a nature disaster (especially, forest fire) response plan with detailed descriptions
of responsibilities, and training of relevant institutions in natural disaster response.
• Local capacity building in rural areas for prevention and mitigation of natural disasters caused
by unsustainable natural resources management.
• Elaboration of a strategic development plan for the fuel-energy complex of Georgia, taking into
account new realities.
• Provision of the regions with alternative and renewable sources of energy; facilitation of
knowledge generation and capacity building for achieving energy saving and efficiency. Imple-
mentation of pilot and demonstration projects to promote energy efficiency (winterization of
public buildings, energy efficient stoves, etc.) and renewable energy sources
• Introduction of alternative livelihood and of effective and sustainable agriculture to prevent
possible conflicts over demand on natural resources (land, water, fuel wood, etc.).
• Intensification of efforts for the rehabilitation and strengthening of the tourist image of the
country and development of relevant infrastructure.
• Forests cut and destroyed after 1990 are not allowed for participation in CDM according to
the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. We recommend to the Georgian government to propose
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol to consider rehabili-
tation of forests burned and destroyed as a result of military operation within the CDM in
order to attract additional investments.
• Preparation of reports for updating the Secretariats of the related international conventions and
treaties. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Georgia, and national and international environmental organizations should call upon
the international community to resolutely condemn Russian actions in Georgia and reconsider
the relevance of the Russian Federation’s participation in international environmental treaties
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention of Protection of the
Black Sea against Pollution, Ramsar Convention, CITES and others. Consider compensation by
the Russian Federation for the environmental damages caused by military aggression.
CIPDD, 2008 43
43
Timeline: From the Independence of Kosovo to the Russian-Georgian War
February-August 2008
The following is the chronology* of Russian-Georgian relations from the independence of Kosovo
until August 2008.
February 14 Russian president Vladimir Putin censures Europe for its double standards in deal-
ing with breakaway territories and warns that the unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s
independence will undermine the existing world order, and inevitably set a prece-
dent for Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniester.
February 17 Kosovo unilaterally declares independence from Serbia. Within days, the former
Serbian province is recognised as independent by the USA, UK, Germany, Italy and
France. [To date, Kosovo’s independence has been recognised by 47 sovereign states.]
February 21 Vladimir Putin and Mikheil Saakashvili hold talks in Moscow on the sidelines of
an informal CIS summit. The two presidents underline positive tendencies in Rus-
sian-Georgian relations.
February 22 Russia calls upon Georgia to adopt special legislation to ban any foreign military
presence on its territory.
February 26 The separatist government of Abkhazia announces that a large-scale military exer-
cise will take place in Abkhazia on March 1-5.
February 27 The Georgian foreign ministry protests against polling for Russian presidential elec-
tions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia without Tbilisi’s consent, and denounces the
move as a breach of international law and a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty.
March 1 Georgia proposes to change the existing format of the South Ossetian settlement pro-
cess, replacing the Joint Control Commission (JCC) with the new formula 2+2+2. The
new commission would include Georgia and its South Ossetian provisional administra-
tion; Russia and the de facto government of South Ossetia; and the OSCE and EU.
March 5 Yuri Levitin, the Russian transport minister, tells Russian lawmakers that Russia
is planning to use Sukhumi airport during the preparation for the 2014 Winter
Olympics.
March 6 The Russian foreign ministry announces that Russia has decided to unilaterally
withdraw from the 1996 CIS agreement on imposing economic sanctions against
Abkhazia.
March 11 The parliament of Georgia passes a special resolution to condemn Russia’s unilat-
eral decision to quit the 1996 CIS agreement.
March 21 The Russian Duma passes a resolution urging the Kremlin to examine whether it
would be appropriate and useful for Russia to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia
as independent.
* Compiled from civil.ge
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March 28 President Saakashvili announces his new peace initiative for Abkhazia. Its main
components are: a joint free economic zone; Abkhazia’s guaranteed representation in
the central government of Georgia, including the new constitutional post of vice
president with veto power in all Abkhazia-related matters; and joint customs and
border control. Sukhumi rejects the initiative as unacceptable.
April 3 At a summit in Bucharest NATO rejects Georgia’s and Ukraine’s bid for a Mem-
bership Action Plan (MAP) but gives assurances that these countries will become
members of the alliance in the future.
April 12 Georgia offers to the de facto authorities of Abkhazia to set up joint police units
to maintain law and order in the conflict zone. Sukhumi rejects the proposal.
April 15 The UN Security Council passes a resolution on Abkhazia in which it supports
Georgia’s territorial integrity and praises the Russian peacekeeping troops for their
significant role in providing stability and security in the conflict zone. Besides, the
Security Council extends the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) by six months.
April 16 Russian president Vladimir Putin orders his government to establish formal ties with
the de-facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
April 29 The Russian defence ministry announces its plan to increase the number of Russian
peacekeepers in Abkhazia and to set up 15 additional checkpoints at the adminis-
trative border of the province.
April 20 A Russian MIG-29 fighter shoots down an unmanned Georgian drone over Abkhazia.
Video evidence is made public.
April 30 A NATO spokesman says that Russia’s decision of April 16 would further worsen
the already fragile situation in Abkhazia.
May 1 Russia deploys additional peacekeeping units in Abkhazia. The USA calls upon
Moscow to reconsider its policy in Abkhazia.
May 2 The European Union expresses deep concern over growing Russian-Georgian ten-
sions.
May 5 The Georgian foreign ministry officially notifies Russia that Georgia has unilaterally
withdrawn from the 1995 Russian-Georgian agreement on cooperation in air de-
fence.
May 7 Additional Russian forces set up two bases in the villages of Akamara and Arasadzikhi
(Ochamchira district), according to RIA Novosti.
May 8 UNOMIG denies that forces are amassing at the administrative border of Abkhazia,
admitting, however, that it requested the Russian military command to comment on
the danger of ceasefire violations and explain whether the rise in troop numbers
(personnel and equipment) is proportionate.
May 16 The UN General Assembly passes a resolution on Abkhazia that recognises the right
of IDPs and refugees, as well as their descendants, to return to their homes. Russia
denounces the resolution as “counter-productive”.
CIPDD, 2008 45
After August 2008: Consequences of the Russian-Georgian War
May 21 Parliamentary elections are held in Georgia. Two buses are blasted by explosives in
the village of Khurcha near the administrative border of Abkhazia. The buses have
ferried ethnic Georgian residents from the Gali district of Abkhazia to the polling
stations of Zugdidi.
May 31 The Russian defence ministry says that it is sending engineering troops to Abkhazia
to reconstruct railways and roads there.
June 4 NATO urges Russia to pull out its engineering troops from Abkhazia.
June 6 The Russian and Georgian presidents, Dimitry Medvedev and Mikheil Saakashvili,
meet in St. Petersburg.
June 19 The railway in Sukhumi is hit by two explosions.
June 23 EU envoys in Georgia arrive in Tskhinvali for a fact-finding mission.
June 25 Georgian officials say that Tbilisi is ready to resume the peace process provided
Russia withdraws its additional forces from Abkhazia and cancels the April 16
resolution (that established formal ties).
July 1 Russia establishes a sea link between Sochi and Gagra.
July 3 Dimitry Sanakoyev’s motorcade comes under attack. One member of his detail is
killed.
July 6 Mikheil Saakashvili and Dimitry Medvedev meet in Astana.
July 8 Tbilisi proposes to set up a joint police force in Gali and Ochamchira. The USA
calls for international police units to be deployed in Abkhazia. Sukhumi turns down
the American proposal.
July 9 Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, visits Tbilisi to discuss prospects of the
conflict resolution with the Georgian leadership. The same day, Russian military
aircraft violate Georgian air space.
July 10 The Russian foreign ministry acknowledges for the first time that Russian aircraft
have flown over South Ossetia, in order to cool some “hot heads” in Tbilisi.
July 11 In response to the Russian foreign ministry’s statement, Tbilisi orders its ambassa-
dor in Moscow to return to Georgia. The Russian government announces precondi-
tions for the peace process in Abkhazia: the Georgian government must sign a pact
stipulating that it would never use force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and with-
draw Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge.
July 17 Germany enters the conflict resolution process in Abkhazia. The German foreign
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier visits Sukhumi for talks with the de facto presi-
dent of Abkhazia. Afterwards, he holds talks with his Russian counterpart in Mos-
cow. Russia expresses scepticism about Germany’s three-stage peace plan.
July 19 Tskhinvali rejects the EU’s proposal to hold direct talks in Brussels.
July 25 Sukhumi rejects the German roadmap plan and refuses to attend talks in Berlin.
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August 1 Four Georgian police officers are wounded when their car explodes in South Ossetia.
August 2 Seven Georgians are wounded by gunfire in South Ossetia. Russia denies that its
peacekeeping troops are involved in the incident. North Ossetia promises to support
South Ossetia if it comes under attack. South Ossetian authorities order full
mobilisation and appeal to North Caucasus volunteers for help.
August 3 Women and children, packed in fourteen buses and five vans, move from Tskhinvali
to North Ossetia.
August 4 The Abkhaz separatist authorities refuse to meet the Group of Friends of the UN
Secretary General in protest against the escalation of tensions in South Ossetia.
August 5 Estonia expresses support for the EU’s peacekeeping role in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Due to the danger of a new conflict, 819 residents of South Ossetia flee
to North Ossetia.
August 6 The Russian co-chairman of the JCC confirms that talks between the parties are
scheduled for August 7 in Tskhinvali. The de facto authorities of South Ossetia and
Russian peacekeepers report massive shootouts in South Ossetia. South Ossetia refuses
to participate in the talks.
August 7 According to the de facto authorities of South Ossetia, 18 South Ossetian resi-
dents have been wounded overnight as a result of shooting in the conflict zone.
The Georgian interior ministry claims that late at night on August 6, Ossetian
separatist forces shelled Georgian villages: Eredvi, Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli.
Two Georgian peacekeepers were reportedly wounded. Russia sends reinforce-
ments to South Ossetia via the Roki Tunnel. Evacuation of women and children
begins in Georgian villages around Tskhinvali. In the evening, the Georgian gov-
ernment declares a unilateral ceasefire. The shelling of Georgian villages contin-
ues. Georgian positions near Tskhinvali also come under attack. The Georgian
government announces that it has ordered the army to restore constitutional order
in South Ossetia.
August 8 Fighting rages on the outskirts of Tskhinvali. According to the Georgian, hundreds
of additional troops pour into South Ossetia via the Roki Tunnel. Abkhazia amasses
troops on the administrative border. Vladimir Putin, attending the opening ceremony
of Beijing Olympics, warns Georgia. NATO, Council of Europe, and PACE call for
an unconditional ceasefire. Washington urges the parties to restore the pre-August
6th status quo. Russian jets bomb Kareli, Gori, and airfields in Vaziani and Marneuli.
Russian sources claim that hundreds of civilians died in Tskhinvali.
August 9 Russian aircraft carry out several bombing raids against Gori, Poti, Senaki, and
Kodori Gorge. Dozens of civilians are reported killed. Abkhaz forces begin military
operation to expel Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge. Georgia declares martial
law and full mobilisation.
August 10 Russian aircraft bomb Zugdidi, Senaki, Gori, and Kareli districts, Upper Abkhazia,
and the outskirts of Tbilisi. Georgian forces retreat from Tskhinvali. Thousands of
Georgian troops are airlifted back from Iraq. Tbilisi declares a unilateral ceasefire
and orders troops to withdraw from South Ossetia. Thousands of Georgians from
Tskhinvali and Gori districts and the town of Gori flee to Tbilisi. Many Georgian
residents of Zugdidi leave their town. Some 6,000 Russian troops, 90 tanks, 150
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armoured personnel carriers and 250 artillery systems enter South Ossetia through
the Roki Tunnel. 4,000 Russian servicemen arrive in the Ochamchira seaport of
Abkhazia from Sevastopol. Warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet enter Abkhazia’s
territorial waters. Moscow accuses Georgia of genocide. OSCE emphasises that
Russia is no longer a mediator but a party to the conflict.
August 11 Russian air strikes continue throughout the night: Tbilisi Sea, Dedoplistqaro, Senaki,
Ganmukhuri, and Khelvachauri are attacked. The foreign ministers of the presiding
countries of OSCE and EU, Finland and France, arrive in Tbilisi. Mikheil Saakashvili
signs the EU-brokered ceasefire plan. Russian army units enter Zugdidi, Senaki and
Gori. There are widespread fears that Russian troops may advance on Tbilisi.
August 12 Gori is bombed again. The Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov makes it
clear that Moscow seeks regime change in Tbilisi. Russian president Dimitry
Medvedev offers a halt to the Russian military operation in Georgia if Tbilisi
fulfils two conditions: the Georgian army must disarm, and Tbilisi must sign an
agreement promising to never use force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Georgia announces its decision to quit the CIS. Russian forces enter Poti. At
talks in Moscow, French president Nicolas Sarkozy and his Russian opposite
Dimitry Medvedev endorse a six-point peace plan. Sarkozy arrives in Tbilisi
from Moscow with the peace plan. Mikheil Saakashvili signs the document. The
Presidents of Ukraine, Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania, as well as the Latvian
prime minister, visit Tbilisi to show their solidarity with Georgia. Abkhaz forces
take control of the Kodori Gorge.
August 13 Georgia files a lawsuit against Russia at the Hague international tribunal. US presi-
dent George Bush states firmly that the US stands by the democratically elected
Georgian government and demands that Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity be respected. He orders the US navy and air force to provide humanitarian aid
to Georgia.
August 15 The Russian army controls Samegrelo region and Gori. Condoleezza Rice, US Sec-
retary of State, arrives in Tbilisi after visiting France. Georgia signs the French-
brokered six-point ceasefire agreement.
August 16 Russian troops blow up a key railway bridge in the Kaspi municipality, cutting the
only railway link between eastern and western Georgia. Russian president Dimitry
Medvedev signs the six-point ceasefire agreement.
August 17 Dimitry Medvedev says that Russia will begin pulling out its troops from Georgia
on August 18. The German chancellor Angela Merkel visits Tbilisi after talks with
Medvedev in Sochi.
August 19 Russian military personnel and hardware remain in Georgia and there are no signs
of withdrawal. Russia and Georgia exchange POWs. The OSCE decides to send 20
observers to South Ossetia immediately to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire
agreement and deliveries of humanitarian aid.
August 20 According to Georgian official sources, 215 Georgian citizens died in the war.
According to the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ossetian civilians died
in conflict. The Russian president Dimitry Medvedev tells the French leader that
Russian troops will pull out of undisputed Georgian territories on August 22.
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August 22 Russian forces reinforce their positions in the “buffer zones”. They set up two lines
of checkpoints in the “security zone” around South Ossetia: the first line is made
up of eight checkpoints along the actual military line of control; the second line
consists of ten checkpoints deployed along the administrative border of South Ossetia.
The buffer zone is sandwiched between the two lines.
August 23 Georgian parliament votes to extend martial law till September 8.
August 25 France announces an EU summit for September 1 to discuss the Georgian crisis.
The upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, passes a reso-
lution urging the president to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
August 26 The Russian president Dimitry Medvedev issues a decree recognizing Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as independent states.
